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NEPAL’S NEW ALLIANCE: 
THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES AND THE MAOISTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Nepal’s mainstream parties and Maoists have reached 
agreement on a basic alliance against the monarchy. That 
they were talking was not new: all sides have kept in 
contact throughout the ten-year-old conflict. But this time 
they have developed a serious agenda which offers the 
framework of a peace deal. Their dialogue had India’s 
tacit backing and the deal was finalised at meetings in 
New Delhi. 
The agreement reflects some important achievements: the 
Maoists have formally committed themselves to joining a 
multiparty system and the mainstream parties have signed 
up to a process of constitutional change. Each side has 
recognised past mistakes and vowed not to repeat them. 
But many issues present challenges which have only been 
deferred. The Maoists reject the parties’ call to restore the 
last parliament and the parties have not accepted the 
rebels’ republican agenda. Questions of disarmament, 
monitoring and future talks facilitation have been brushed 
over lightly. And it is not clear if the new alliance will 
hold out an olive branch to the king or try to force him 
into submission. 
The palace, which runs an embattled government, 
had tried to conceal its unease as the talks went on but 
ministers have now gone on the offensive against the new 
alliance. Conservative Nepali commentators and U.S. 
diplomats had warned repeatedly of consequences if the 
parties did a deal with the Maoists. Some critics hoped 
that the talks would fall apart or be derailed, but the 
twelve-point November agreement has dramatically – 
though not yet irreversibly – changed political realities. 
Why have the parties and Maoists done a deal? They have 
differing political imperatives, and they have not changed 
their long-term goals, but there are some grounds for 
compromise and both have realised that their own strength 
is not enough to be decisive. The discussions have 
identified a possible structure for peace talks – progressing 
via interim arrangements to a constitutional assembly and 
disarmament – but each issue raises its own problems. 
The mechanics of dialogue are also far from 
straightforward. Although all sides had previously kept 
channels of communication open, formal talks bring risks. 
This engagement has taken place more comfortably thanks 
to India’s tacit endorsement. However, the negotiators 
lack the safety net of international legitimacy and open 
facilitation. The Maoists are prepared and have a clear 
strategy while the parties are still working out joint 
positions. Each side has been happy to publicise certain 
details but the text of the November agreement is thin and 
meetings have necessarily been secretive. The Indians 
have played their cards close to their chest and left even 
close allies guessing about their intentions. 
The parties’ willingness to deal with the rebels has raised 
the stakes for all players in the conflict. It has also brought 
new risks. This is only a bilateral process; other crucial 
players – notably the palace – are excluded. The parties 
are neither fully united nor well prepared and may concede 
too much too easily as bargaining progresses, while the 
Maoists retain their arms and could revert to a military 
approach at any time or could use talks and a loose alliance 
to build a stronger urban base and squeeze the mainstream 
parties in their last bastion. The November deal could 
prompt a violent backlash if the palace feels threatened. 
Nevertheless, the alliance presents new opportunities: 
 the Maoists are acting under genuine imperatives 
and constraints and they are willing to offer 
significant concessions; 
 this is a chance to bring the Maoists into the 
mainstream while they are still united and can 
bring their armed cadres with them; 
 the dialogue has already led to a commitment in 
principle to disarm; 
 this could be the best way of addressing broadly 
acceptable parts of the Maoist agenda without 
giving way on everything; and 
 if managed carefully, the process could strengthen 
democracy and help address weaknesses in the 
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1990 multiparty constitution and the parties that 
have embodied it. 
The ultimate outcome of the talks process cannot be 
predicted but the loose party-Maoist alliance has created 
a new dynamic. In their first high-level face-to-face 
meeting, party leaders and the Maoists have forged a 
basic plan for joint action against the monarchy. In the 
weeks to come this plan will take more concrete shape, 
and discussions will move to a second stage. 
A range of factors will then affect the approaches of 
both sides. Internal tensions and calculations of personal 
advantage may be particularly debilitating for the 
mainstream parties. As always, both sides will be watching 
other domestic and international forces and adjusting 
course accordingly. The king, keen to bolster his own 
power, still has cards to play. The talks may not in 
themselves lead to a new peace process but they offer 
the best hope of breaking Kathmandu’s political impasse. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 28 November 2005 
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NEPAL’S NEW ALLIANCE: 
THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES AND THE MAOISTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal’s mainstream parties and the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist) have agreed to pursue a joint, if still 
vague, strategy against what they call “the autocratic 
monarchy” and a plan for constitutional reform that, if 
implemented, will bring the Maoists into mainstream, 
non-violent politics.1 The two sides have been engaged in 
serious talks since May 2005, their sustained dialogue the 
most notable result of King Gyanendra’s February 2005 
royal coup.2 Although the initial months of talks did not 
produce any concrete outcome, the leaders held their first 
joint face-to-face discussions on 17 November in New 
Delhi, overcoming the last obstacles to a basic deal.3 
Their twelve-point agreement was published five days 
later in simultaneous press releases from the seven-party 
alliance and Maoist chairman Prachanda.4 
Amidst the drama of its conclusion and sudden 
announcement, the deal itself has been little analysed. 
Its achievements have been highlighted by sympathetic 
commentators: 
 it formalises the Maoist offer to enter a multiparty 
political system and specifies an elected constituent 
assembly as the accepted forum for all sides to 
debate the constitutional revisions that will shape 
the new set-up; 
 
 
1 For the text of the parties-Maoists agreement announced on 22 
November 2005, see Appendix B below. This report uses the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – abbreviated to CPN(M) – 
and “Maoists” interchangeably, although strictly speaking the 
party is only one part of the broader Maoist movement. See 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°104, Nepal's Maoists: Their 
Aims, Structure and Strategy, 27 October 2005, for a detailed 
explanation. 
2 Crisis Group reporting on the Nepal conflict both before and 
after the royal coup is available at www.crisisgroup.org. 
3 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 17–18 November and 
New Delhi, 18–19 November. 
4 Seven-party and Prachanda press statements, 22 November 
2005. 
 the parties and Maoists both admit to past 
shortcomings and promise to improve their 
behaviour, while reaffirming their commitment 
to human rights, including full civil and political 
liberties; and 
 both sides call for impartial outside assistance, 
led by the United Nations “or any other reliable 
international supervision”, in supervising elections 
and overseeing the cantonment of state and Maoist 
forces. 
However, the agreement is silent on many of the tricky 
issues that will have to be addressed, some of them in the 
near future, if it is to lead to a sustained peace process: 
 there has clearly been no meeting of minds so far 
on major political issues such as the future role 
of the monarchy, the electoral system and reforms 
to address caste, gender, ethnic and regional 
inequality; 
 the brief mention of cantonment during elections 
is not the same as a formal promise of Maoist 
disarmament and does not in itself address the 
threat of continuing coercion and intimidation; 
 there are no detailed plans for monitoring and 
implementing the agreement, nor for shaping 
the agenda of the inevitable further rounds of 
negotiation; and 
 the scope and nature of joint action to pressure the 
monarchy has not been clarified nor is it clear what 
calculations the parties and Maoists have made 
about how the palace will react to their deal. 
The party-Maoist engagement, much of which has 
been conducted semi-publicly and with India’s tacit 
endorsement, has divided observers. Some saw the 
tentative negotiations as an opening to revive a peace 
process and viewed this as the best chance to persuade 
the Maoists gradually to abandon their armed struggle 
and enter multiparty politics. Civil society groups 
have welcomed the November agreement; the United 
Nations and diplomatic missions have offered cautious 
endorsement. Others warned that the parties were being 
dangerously naive and allowing themselves to be used 
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by the rebels. The royal government has yet to comment 
formally on the deal but initial responses from individual 
ministers have been largely negative, with particular 
criticism of the supposed external role in facilitating 
the talks. 
Whatever reactions it provokes, the party-Maoist 
engagement is not the result of capricious whim on either 
side. It is the product of identifiable political imperatives 
and a rational attempt to negotiate contrasting interests. In 
the face of the palace’s refusal to accommodate their 
demands, the main parliamentary parties view talking to 
the Maoists as their logical option. For the Maoists, this 
dialogue represents the best chance to address strategic 
weaknesses that they have been forced to recognise. 
The new alliance could, at a minimum, compel the 
palace to return to a constitutional arrangement in which 
the parliamentary parties have a significant role. If the 
king does not relent, and the parties stay intact in the 
face of any moves the palace makes to divide them, the 
limited alliance between the parliamentary parties and 
the underground Maoists may develop a platform of joint 
action against a politically active monarchy. 
The complex tripartite political conflict between the 
palace, the parliamentary parties and the Maoists appears 
to have polarised for now into a rather simpler struggle 
between pro-royal and anti-royal forces. In the event of a 
united, nationwide campaign against direct monarchical 
rule, the palace and the military would find it difficult 
to maintain the status quo. However, the situation is 
not quite that simple. The party-Maoist alliance is neither 
deep nor stable, representing a convergence of interests 
rather than genuinely shared goals. It may develop further 
but the king also has some cards left to play to preserve 
his political power. 
The palace has refused to consider any compromise with 
either the political parties or the Maoists. Despite the fact 
that the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) has gained little 
ground militarily, it has firmly rejected the idea of 
reciprocating the unilateral ceasefire the insurgents 
declared in early September 2005. For the time being, a 
security-first approach to the insurgency accompanies 
the palace’s longer-term drive to re-establish political 
supremacy over the democratic institutions. The king 
has disregarded a chorus of domestic and international 
criticism since his coup, although pressures are quietly 
building.5 
It is too early to predict the party-Maoist alliance’s 
ultimate destination. The participants themselves know 
 
 
5 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°41, Nepal: Beyond Royal 
Rule, 15 September 2005. 
that the number of variables involved requires them to be 
flexible. Two major elements of the political landscape 
are relatively constant: the palace (backed by the RNA) 
and the Maoists. Since the king reduced their role to street 
agitation, parliamentary forces have oscillated between 
these two constants. However, the relationship between 
the Maoists and the palace is not set in stone: at times they 
have tacitly conspired against parliamentary governments 
and the civil police, while at other times the ideological 
gulf between them has been sharply defined. 
Each force’s past conduct and perceived interests will 
modulate, if not determine, the decisions of the other two. 
None can act independently, yet none can trust the others 
fully. Given this balance of domestic forces, external 
factors assume great importance. Regardless of their 
public rhetoric or behaviour, all political actors in Nepal 
keep one eye constantly on international power centres 
and seek to build support beyond the country’s borders. 
The key question is whether the tentative alliance can 
either decisively shift the alignment of internal political 
forces or prompt a re-evaluation of international attitudes. 
Despite the many shifting variables, the positions, 
interests and calculations of the sides are relatively clear. 
This report examines why the parliamentary parties and 
the Maoists have done a deal and analyses the substance 
of their agreement. It also details the underlying interests 
of both sides and explains how these have shaped 
their negotiations. It assesses the internal and external 
political dynamics shaping this process and the resulting 
opportunities, costs and risks. As the November agreement 
moves the process into a new phase, the final sections 
look at possible scenarios for the next steps and their 
implications. 
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II. THE PARTIES 
A. OUTLOOK 
Nepal’s major parliamentary parties have been uniformly 
hostile towards the Maoists since the launch of their armed 
struggle in 1996. However, they have also maintained 
channels of communication with them. Until a few years 
before they went underground, the first generation Maoist 
leaders had been active participants in the movement 
for constitutional rule and popular sovereignty.6 Most 
mainstream party leaders have links of some sort to the 
senior Maoist leaders – one of whom, party spokesman 
Krishna Bahadur Mahara, was a member of the 1991 
parliament – and have engaged them in private informal 
talks from time to time in the past ten years.7 Of the 
smaller parties, Unity Centre-Masal and its parliamentary 
front organisation, Janamorcha Nepal,8 have maintained 
fraternal relations with the Maoists. This is due to close 
personal links that have survived serious differences 
on tactics and strategy: the Maoists broke from these 
organisations to engage in armed struggle and have 
harshly criticised their former comrades.9 
The major parties have been inconsistent in dealing with 
the Maoists. For example, within the Nepali Congress 
(NC) – which was in power for most of the period 
between the start of the insurgency and the dissolution of 
parliament in October 2002 – there were differences 
of approach between Girija Prasad Koirala and Sher 
Bahadur Deuba, who both served as prime minister.10 The 
former consistently adopted a law and order approach to 
the insurgency and attempted to crush it through police 
action. The latter declared a unilateral ceasefire in July 
 
 
6 Deepak Thapa, “Radicalism and the emergence of the Maoists”, 
in Michael Hutt (ed.), Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist 
Rebellion (London, 2004), p. 35.  
7 For example, eleven senior leaders from six leftist parties – 
including UML General Secretary Madhav Nepal – met top 
Maoist leaders Prachanda, Baburam Bhattarai and Mohan 
Vaidya for talks in the Indian town of Siliguri, West Bengal, 
in October 2001. 
8 The Janamorcha Nepal, hereafter Janamorcha, is sometimes 
referred to by its English translation, People’s Front Nepal. 
9 The Maoists and the Janamorcha have a history of animosity 
since the beginning of the people’s war, with the former attacking 
the latter’s cadre in many of the western districts in which both 
were active. The Janamorcha has held protest rallies and exposure 
campaigns against the Maoists, something that no other party has 
seriously undertaken. Nevertheless, they are generally willing to 
ally politically. 
10 The contradictory positions adopted by parties and 
individuals continued through the governments of Krishna 
Prasad Bhattarai (May 1999 to March 2000), Koirala (March 
2000 to July 2001) and Deuba (July 2001 to October 2002). 
2001 when he came to power and invited the Maoists for 
talks. When negotiations broke down, he too opted for a 
military solution, labelling them terrorists and deploying 
the army.11 
While parties in power tried to tackle the insurgency with 
the state machinery at their disposal, the parliamentary 
forces collectively failed to address the Maoists’ political 
agenda. Mainstream leaders were conservative and 
cautious, their policies moulded by a strong vested 
interest in maintaining the social and economic status 
quo. This left them unable to deal with the Maoist demands 
while the insurgency was still in its infancy. Eventually, 
the parties had to come to terms with some of the key 
ones, such as a constituent assembly and republic, which 
they had previously opposed. 
When the poorly-paid and ill-equipped police failed to 
contain the rebels, there was no option but to upgrade the 
counter-insurgency to a full-fledged military campaign. 
With the palace in de facto control of the Royal Nepalese 
Army (RNA),12 parliament and government progressively 
surrendered their constitutional powers as a price for the 
military’s participation in the counter-insurgency. By the 
time the parties woke up to this reality, the palace and the 
military had effectively taken over the institutions of the 
state.13 The royal coup of 1 February 2005 was the 
culmination of this process. 
When the RNA was deployed in November 2001, 
parliament was asked to approve a state of emergency and 
pass anti-terrorist legislation. The civil war was fought by 
the palace and the army on their own terms. In October 
2002, Deuba’s government was dismissed by the king. 
 
 
11 Deuba had also espoused a security-led response to the 
insurgency from its outset in 1996, when he was prime minister. 
12 Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, Towards a Lasting Peace in 
Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005, explains 
the RNA’s constitutional position and relationship to the king. 
Army personnel are exempt from the purview of civilian 
statutory bodies such as the Commission for the Investigation of 
Abuse of Authority. The RNA, however, insists its operations 
are “carried out under the jurisdiction and authority of the local 
and district administrations as they were in the past”. Letter 
from Brigadier Dipak K. Gurung, director, Directorate of Public 
Relations, Royal Nepalese Army Headquarters, to Gareth 
Evans, Crisis Group President, 20 October 2005. Brigadier 
Gurung was writing in response to Crisis Group Briefing, Beyond 
Royal Rule, op.cit. 
13 For example, the unified command structure introduced in 
November 2003 gave the RNA effective operational control 
of civilian police as well as increased influence in district-
level government; the appointment of local and regional 
administrators similarly extended palace power. See Hari 
Roka, “Militarisation and democratic rule in Nepal”, Himal 
South Asian, December 2003, and Crisis Group reporting at 
www.crisisgroup.org. 
Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists 
Crisis Group Asia Report Nº106, 28 November 2005 Page 4 
 
 
 
 
Since then the parties have been fighting a losing battle 
with the monarch and the military to regain their authority 
within the constitutional institutions. They had already 
been forced to surrender most of their influence across the 
countryside in the face of a brutally effective Maoist 
campaign to eliminate pluralist politics. 
B. IMPERATIVES 
The parties’ approach to engaging the Maoists is based on 
their perception of shared threats and weaknesses. Their 
overriding aim is to recover their position at the heart of 
a multiparty system and thereby political power. From 
1996 to mid-2001 the main threat to the parliamentary 
system was the Maoists. Following the June 2001 palace 
massacre and Gyanendra’s accession to the throne, the 
palace has become more of a threat. The king has played 
party leaders off against each other and profited from 
their disunity and hunger for office. When protests have 
threatened to gain mass support in urban areas, the king 
has capitalised on the natural fault lines between and 
within parties by selectively offering leaders and parties 
the opportunity to run nominal governments.14 
The parliamentary parties have lost touch with their own 
support bases and the electorate at large. Since the last 
general election in 1999, active interaction with voters has 
been minimal. While extra-parliamentary forces steadily 
consolidated their positions, the main parliamentary parties 
– and factions within each of them – were preoccupied 
with using their urban cadres to pursue purely partisan 
objectives. Within the NC, rival factions led by Krishna 
Prasad Bhattarai, Girija Prasad Koirala, and Sher Bahadur 
Deuba used the Maoist insurgency to undermine each 
other and by July 2002 their party had split. At the same 
time, the dissolution of local elected bodies exacerbated 
their problems, reducing opportunities to replenish their 
ranks and keep in daily contact with the public. 
The parties have surrendered institutional territory to the 
palace and political territory to the Maoists. In the 1999 
elections – which had the highest turnout in Nepal’s 
electoral history – the NC and Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unified Marxist-Leninist, hereafter UML) between 
them won almost 70 per cent of the vote.15 This mass 
 
 
14 Between October 2002 and February 2005, the king appointed 
three governments, each of which he rapidly dismissed 
(although royalist prime ministers Chand and Thapa opted 
to resign rather than be ousted). 
15 The turnout was 66.79 per cent – an improvement from the 
all-time low of 61.68 per cent in the 1994 elections. The 
argument that mass disillusionment with the parties had set in 
due to frequent changes of government does not explain 
why the parliament that witnessed the largest number of 
base, had it been cultivated and nurtured, should have 
been a bulwark against both royalist and Maoist attempts 
to encroach on the parliamentary system. But the parties’ 
sustained neglect of mass politics since 1999, their narrow 
focus on Kathmandu intrigues, and their factional 
infighting and jockeying for power eroded popular 
sympathy. Few tears were shed when Gyanendra sidelined 
them after October 2002. Nor could they boast of having 
addressed the fundamental grievances that drove support 
for the Maoists. 
By the time the king completed his power grab in February 
2005, the parties had lost all significant leverage. 
They agreed to push for revival of the dissolved 1999 
parliament, as their most tangible evidence of a mass 
base and their last source of institutional power. The 
king would not give in to this demand, the international 
community did not support it and the Maoists opposed 
it. As the parties ceded their grip on political influence, 
their conduct and demands lost relevance. 
While the parliamentary parties are not facing total 
extinction – they survived 30 years of royal rule before 
1990 under much more strained circumstances – they 
are seriously weakened. The combination of external 
threats and their own multiple shortcomings have left 
them with only minimal power to revive their fortunes. 
The immediate imperatives for them to consider in 
dealing with the Maoists include: 
 Need for allies. The February 2005 royal coup 
finally forced them to accept that they lack 
independent leverage. Talking to the Maoists 
may lead to substantive negotiations on a final 
settlement or may just put pressure on the palace 
to relent and cut a deal. In either case the parties 
could profit from careful engagement. 
 Countering Maoist violence. The parties have 
suffered from direct armed assault by the Maoists 
for several years. As they surrendered first political 
territory, then the umbrella of the state security 
forces, they have had no means of their own to 
defend against Maoist violence. Dealing with the 
Maoists may be their best bet to obtain a truce that 
protects their workers. 
 Little popular support. While the people still 
appear to favour a multiparty system in principle, 
there is a visible lack of countrywide popular 
sentiment for the parties. The movement against 
the palace which was initiated in 2003 was 
predominantly urban and largely confined to 
 
 
governments was followed by elections with the highest 
turnout. Moreover, the vote was gradually being consolidated 
between the two major parties.  
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party cadres. This lack of mass support may 
have emboldened the king to seize full power in 
February. 
 Radicalisation of student and other grassroots 
activists. Students formed the backbone of the 
anti-palace agitation but their more radical 
demands, such as for a constituent assembly, 
were rejected by the NC and UML leaderships. 
Rank and file opinion is largely against the king. 
Party leaders can use their dialogue with the 
Maoists to please their more radical cadres and to 
threaten the palace with republicanism. 
 Lack of leverage on the palace. There is little the 
parties can do currently to force the king’s regime 
to compromise with them. As if to press home 
this point, the government has made no secret of 
its disdain for political parties. For the last two 
years, while the king refused to concede to their 
demands, the Maoists have consistently sought to 
conduct joint agitation with the parliamentary 
parties against a common enemy.16 The Maoist 
analysis about the general direction in which the 
polity was drifting was largely correct. 
Until the Maoist position was clarified, the political parties 
feared the insurgents might do a deal with the king. This 
would have meant many more years in the wilderness for 
the parties. Reports of clandestine agreements between 
the palace and the Maoists in the early days of the 
insurgency are part of Nepal’s political folklore.17 The 
parties have themselves entered ideologically incompatible 
cohabitations so such an apparently contradictory 
partnership could not be ruled out. When the Maoists 
agreed to talk with the palace-appointed Lokendra Bahadur 
Chand government in 2003, such suspicions were 
heightened. Indeed, one question that fuelled the Maoists’ 
internal debates of late 2004 and early 2005 was whether 
to do a deal with the palace. The parliamentary parties’ 
apprehension was not unfounded. 
 
 
16 As early as April 2003, while the Maoists were negotiating 
with the Chand government, Baburam Bhattarai, in discussions 
with Koirala, had supported joint efforts with the parties to 
establish popular sovereignty. Crisis Group interview, August 
2005. 
17 After the 1 June 2001 palace massacre, Baburam Bhattarai 
claimed in a newspaper article that the Maoists had an 
“undeclared working understanding” with the deceased King 
Birendra, Kantipur, 6 June 2001. Dhirendra, Gyanendra’s 
younger brother, had been the palace point-man for secret 
dealings with the Maoists while Birendra was on the throne; 
he also died in the massacre. 
C. INTERNAL TENSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
1. The alliance 
The parliamentary parties which make up the seven-party 
alliance are the NC, UML, Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
(Anandi Devi), Nepali Congress (Democratic, NC(D)), 
Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Workers and Peasants Party 
(NWPP) and United Left Front. The two which have been 
more or less consistent in their support of the palace – 
the royalist Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and Badri 
Prasad Mandal’s Nepal Sadbhavana Party – are not in 
the alliance. The RPP’s offshoot, former Prime Minister 
Surya Bahadur Thapa’s Rashtriya Janashakti Party, 
has been more circumspect, following the alliance in 
announcing a boycott of proposed municipal polls but not 
joining it. The alliance against the palace has not been 
immune to the lure of office. In April 2004 eight parties 
were aligned, with even the RPP joining in the agitation. 
Within two months, however, the UML, NC(D) and RPP 
had left to form the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led government 
that was dismissed by the king in February 2005. Even 
the NC may have been tempted to abandon the agitation 
in May 2004 when courted by the palace. 
2. Lack of trust 
Given this history of opportunistic behaviour, members 
of the present alliance find it hard to trust each other. 
The NC(D) is regarded by some – particularly its mother 
party, the NC – as liable to abandon the agitation and go 
over to the palace. It is the other six parties that have 
developed enough trust to deal with the Maoists on the 
basis of mutual consultations. Theirs may not be the 
most principled alliance but their collective predicament 
is a strong shared factor. This has led each of the six 
to conclude that the others are similarly motivated to 
pursue dialogue with the Maoists. The NC(D), for now, 
is marginalised. 
3. Internal problems 
Though party leaders have a clear incentive to carry on 
informal negotiations with the Maoists, there are also 
strong internal factors militating against commitment 
to a full-fledged alliance. There are deep horizontal and 
vertical divisions within the major parties and tensions 
between them. Leaders have not been able to formulate 
broadly acceptable policies, and they lack confidence 
in dealing with a force that has always been very clear 
about its objectives and methods. They are also aware 
of their parties’ organisational disrepair. 
Feedback within the parties is limited, and policies tend to 
be determined by a small minority of central figures. In the 
absence of any other institutional sources of power, vertical 
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divisions are inevitable, especially as all parties 
suffer from a surfeit of leaders, not all of whom can be 
accommodated with important offices. This gives party 
offices disproportionate importance at a time when the 
parties themselves command little influence and creates 
friction and factional splits within the organisation. The 
variety of opinions expressed by each party on every 
crucial issue is an expression of this intense factionalism. 
Since parliamentary parties are characterised by extreme 
internal mistrust, they find it difficult to evolve collective 
leadership, create a parliamentary united front and present 
a common agenda to the Maoists for discussion. It is not 
only the Maoists that the parties distrust; they equally 
distrust each other, fearing clandestine deals. Whether 
parties which have shown little sign of long-term vision 
can overcome these dilemmas remains to be seen. 
Moreover, each of the main parties faces its own special 
difficulties. 
4. Nepali Congress 
The NC, generally perceived to be socially conservative, 
has a substantial constituency that wants to preserve the 
socio-economic status quo. It is not immediately clear 
how Girija Prasad Koirala will deal with such forces 
in his party if the bargain with the Maoists involves 
conceding more on the issue of socio-economic reforms 
than they are willing to tolerate. This issue has acquired 
greater importance since the 30 August–2 September 
2005 national convention at which the party dropped 
adherence to constitutional monarchy from its political 
program. Simultaneously, Koirala has packed the central 
organs with his relatives and supporters, all of whom are 
strongly opposed to the Maoists. On the central committee, 
only dissident leader Narahari Acharya has strongly 
argued for an alliance with the Maoists.18 However, since 
the NC is also perceived to be pragmatic, it is possible for 
its leaders to work out a consensus on the assumption that 
they can eventually convert the outcome to their advantage. 
5. UML 
The UML faces a different problem. As a left-oriented, 
cadre-based party it needs a strong organisational base to 
survive. However, it has lost local party workers to the 
Maoists, many of them disillusioned by the party’s failure 
to live up to its leftist image. By 2001, 21 of the Maoists’ 
25 parallel district governments were in formerly UML 
political territory.19 Since then the Maoists have grown 
rapidly in eastern Nepal, further eroding the UML’s 
 
 
18 Crisis group interview, September 2005. 
19 Krishna Hachhethu, “The Nepali state and Maoist 
insurgency, 1996-2001”, in Hutt (ed.), op. cit., p. 77, table 5. 
traditional bastion. Despite this loss of cadres, the UML 
chose to ignore the opinion of its district level workers 
and participate in the palace-appointed Sher Bahadur 
Deuba government of June 2004, after breaking 
ranks with the parties agitating for the restoration of 
constitutional government. 
The UML has more reason than the NC to be hesitant 
about working towards an alliance with the Maoists, 
whom even its pro-republican, second-generation leaders 
oppose.20 Overall, though the party presents an appearance 
of unity, it has its share of dissidence and factional rivalry. 
However, should the party ally with the Maoists, it is less 
likely to split than other parties because of its greater 
internal discipline and the stranglehold that the dominant 
faction has. This would make it difficult for dissident 
leaders to break away, especially since there are few 
options available to them outside the party. 
6. Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandi Devi) 
The Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandi Devi), a regional 
organisation that aims to represent the interests of the 
southern Tarai plainspeople, also faces a dilemma. The 
Maoists have divided Nepal into nine autonomous ethnic 
regions, one of which covers the Sadbhavana Party’s core 
constituency. If this carve-up is tacitly recognised by other 
parties, its political base would be considerably weakened. 
However, it could seize on the conceptual weaknesses of 
these autonomous zones, which are based on the principle 
of historical ethnic homelands, and offer a political critique. 
That might also give the Maoists a way out of the 
corner they have painted themselves into, since few such 
homelands are truly dominated by a single ethnic group. 
But to do this the Sadbhavana Party would have to 
reformulate its own politics and move away from its 
narrowly ethnic/regional agenda. 
7. Nepali Congress (Democratic) 
The NC(D), which led a palace-appointed government 
from June 2004 to February 2005, is the weakest link in 
the alliance. Having opposed the restoration of the 1999 
parliament between 2003 and 2004, on 5 May 2005 the 
party’s central committee did a U-turn to bring it in line 
with other parties.21 Since it has previously accepted 
office on the king’s terms, however, other politicians 
fear it could reach another settlement with the palace. 
Even if the king chooses not offer a deal, the party will 
find it difficult to convince the other alliance members 
 
 
20 Crisis Group interview, August 2005. As discussions 
intensified in November 2005, eleven members of the politburo 
reportedly voiced their opposition to any deal with the Maoists.  
21 “Parties to cobble 7-party alliance”, Kantipur Online, 5 May 
2005. 
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and the Maoists of their bona fides. Girija Prasad Koirala 
is apparently opposed to NC(D) inclusion in closed door 
negotiations with the Maoists.22 If he has his way, the 
party will have to accept its marginal position and continue 
working for greater acceptance. Madhav Nepal did visit 
NC(D) leader Deuba – still detained on corruption charges 
– on 21 November to brief him on the New Delhi talks 
but by this stage the key decisions had already been 
taken.23 
8. Smaller parties 
The other three members of the alliance are too small to 
pull much weight. They are wary of their larger partners 
but because they are small, they are of little use to the 
palace. The Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, which 
espouses Korean-style communism, has on occasion 
expressed support for the king, but he has not paid much 
heed. Internal tensions within these parties over allying 
with the Maoists will be minimal. The Janamorcha fell 
out with the Maoists over the question of armed struggle 
(they criticised it as being untimely) but this has not stood 
in the way of seeking an alliance.24 The United Left Front 
is primarily relevant because it encompasses a handful of 
leaders with personal reputations, such as former armed 
revolutionary C.P. Mainali;25 its position towards talks 
with the Maoists and future policy options is not clear.  
D. PREPARATION FOR TALKS 
The parties were not well prepared for the talks and will 
need to work hard to get themselves into better shape 
if they wish to shape the next rounds of negotiation. 
Preparation will have to embrace key internal reforms: 
unless they can command respect both at the bargaining 
table and outside they will not fare well in any talks. The 
general direction of the compromise that the dialogue 
with the Maoists could yield is no longer in any doubt. 
The issues raised by the Maoists have great mass appeal, 
and the parties can ignore them only at their own peril. 
However, what is more important is the extent of the 
 
 
22 Crisis Group interviews, October 2005. 
23 “Nepal briefs Deuba about Delhi deliberations”, 
nepalnews.com, 21 November 2005. 
24 Mohan Bikram Singh, general secretary of the Unity Centre-
Masal (the underground party for which the Janamorcha is the 
parliamentary front organisation), is overtly hostile towards his 
erstwhile Maoist comrades, many of whom he schooled in 
activism. This is unlikely to decide his party’s policy but the 
party risks being eclipsed if the Maoists join the parliamentary 
mainstream. 
25 The ULF brings together C.P. Mainali’s CPN(ML), Prabhu 
Narayan Chaudhary’s CPN (United Marxist) and Krishna Das 
Shrestha’s CPN (Samyabadi-MLM). 
compromise the parties representing the powerful 
castes and the economic mainstream are willing and 
able to accept without alienating their respective core 
constituencies. 
They will have to consult with their core constituencies 
and seek expert advice on issues such as caste, language, 
economy and political reform. Talks intended to build a 
serious compromise require clarity about the starting 
points of each of the parties. This is a rare opportunity for 
parties to re-examine the fundamental assumptions of 
their political programs and identify the exact degree of 
deviation between their starting points and the reasonably 
acceptable all-party compromise. Such an exercise would 
enable them to sell unpalatable but necessary compromises 
to their constituents in advance. 
Lacking a demonstrable popular support base, the 
immediate function of the parliamentary parties is to 
provide legitimacy to whichever side they align with and 
thus influence their potential hold on Kathmandu. This 
is a limited function but one that the parties can exploit 
to the maximum: they may not have the numbers 
countrywide, but they can bring Kathmandu to a standstill. 
Since the Maoists need them as an ally, they can bargain 
for both the freedom to resume political activity, especially 
in the countryside, and revive local structures and 
protection for the interests they represent.  
Since the Maoists’ unilateral three-month ceasefire 
announced in September 2005, the parties have resumed 
political activity across the countryside.26 Nevertheless, 
they are not as confident of their public reception as they 
used to be. Their preoccupation with factional power 
struggles reduces the likelihood they will engage in 
meaningful reforms. The recent appointment of office 
bearers in the NC is an indication that cronyism and 
nepotism will not go away easily.27 
The present leaders of the parties have not demonstrated 
any significant capability to resolve Nepal’s armed 
conflict and political problems. Their responses to new 
developments tend to be ad hoc, whereas the situation 
calls for detailed strategies with multiple alternatives 
based on a sound grasp of the motivations, imperatives 
and constraints of all political forces. The current dialogue 
has been driven primarily by the Maoists. Marginalised 
party leaders could make themselves more effective by 
 
 
26 The UML took a systematic approach to sending its central 
representatives across the country as soon as it was possible; the 
NC has followed with somewhat less consistency. Activities 
have included mass meetings, building local committees and 
renewing lapsed memberships. 
27 “Most of the old faces elected to NC central committee”, 
nepalnews.com, 2 September 2005. 
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returning to the districts and creating a base at the lower 
levels. This is particularly crucial if mass agitation is to be 
launched, since a younger generation of activists keen on 
protecting their local interests could emerge from the 
process. It would also put the parties in a stronger position 
vis-à-vis the Maoists. 
The parties have not convincingly demonstrated that they 
understand the logic of the events that have overtaken 
them since 2002, or even their own role and significance 
in the current balance of forces. Combined with individual 
motives, their absence from real mass politics and 
uncertain stances on key issues have led their leaders to 
express a diversity of opinions. The intellectual resources 
they command – as opposed to those available to the 
democratic centre as a whole – are less focused than those 
that the Maoists and the palace have marshalled. They 
have made symbolic progress by admitting to mistakes 
while in office but they have been more keen to blame the 
palace and the Maoists than address their own failings. If 
the mainstream is to reassert itself, it must conduct a more 
rigorous analysis of the pattern of events after 1996. It has 
to address the interlinked trends of the constriction of 
parliamentary space, the increasing urban-rural polarity 
in politics from 2001 and the resulting changes in the 
political complexion of Kathmandu and other towns.  
III. THE MAOISTS 
A. OUTLOOK 
The Maoists are exploiting the current situation to 
advance their cause, as they have on every other occasion 
when they have adapted quickly to seize opportunities. 
This is to be expected. The critical questions are not those 
of Maoist sincerity or altruism but of Maoist perceptions 
of self-interest and the chances these may present to build 
a democratic peace settlement. 
Some in the political parties still maintain that the Maoists 
will not settle for anything less than a one-party communist 
dictatorship that seeks to re-educate class enemies. But 
Maoist strategy since the 2003 ceasefire and talks suggests 
a more complex picture. The way in which the Maoists 
have adapted to and exploited situations hints at a 
realisation that absolute victory is neither practical nor 
desirable. “Total seizure of power will unite all forces in 
Nepal against the Maoists, and the latter have been careful 
to prevent that eventuality through the course of the 
people’s war in spite of targeting all of them”, observes a 
political analyst.28 “It is unlikely that the party will attempt 
complete seizure of power when they are aware they lack 
the capacity”.  
The Maoists have benefited throughout their armed 
campaign from patience and long-term planning, qualities 
which their strategy of protracted people’s war – 
whatever its faults may be – has also imbued in their 
cadres. For them, the current situation is a logical 
continuation of political developments since the end of the 
2003 ceasefire. Throughout the agitation against the 
palace in 2003 and 2004, the Maoists had called for a 
coordinated program with the parties, who ignored that 
call since there was still a possibility they would regain 
some governance role on their own. When Kathmandu 
students became the mainstay of the agitation and the 
parties remained passive, the slogan of republican 
democracy was raised. 
The Maoists thus see one crucial advantage in the situation 
after February 2005: the possibility of the king offering 
the parties any significant role is minimal. The most he 
can do is offer posts to some individuals or a collection 
of small parties. This gives the Maoists the chance to 
break the stalemate. 
 
 
28 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, October 2005. 
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B. IMPERATIVES 
The biggest failure of the Maoist strategy is that the urban 
insurrection called for by their Prachandapath doctrine 
was never on the cards.29 Their presence and activity in 
the capital and major towns are limited, and it is here that 
the RNA has had some intelligence successes and broken 
up networks. Although they wield extensive influence in 
the countryside, their military successes and the formation 
of parallel governments in the districts and regions will 
not in themselves overcome the political deadlock in 
Kathmandu. The situation is not yet a complete stalemate 
– small micro-level changes can take place, and there has 
been a shift in Nepal’s overall political framework – but 
the broad structure of the Nepali polity and the distribution 
of power between town and country has not been 
transformed. Since the Maoists control large areas of 
territory without holding all of it militarily, they are not in 
a position to introduce comprehensive changes and durable 
institutions. They cannot build a rural state to match the 
power of the central government.  
In the absence of urban insurrection, the Maoists need to 
move forward politically by making allies in Kathmandu. 
The significance of the capital, with its disproportionate 
concentration of financial and political resources, cannot 
be underestimated in analysing the limits of the “people’s 
war”. As long as the monarchy was constitutional and 
the parties were parliamentary, the Kathmandu consensus 
was anti-Maoist. Constitutional reform was not considered 
necessary. Prominent members of the Kathmandu 
intelligentsia regarded the Nepali constitution as the best 
in the world, and there was little debate on the issue. 
The conservative consensus regarded the constituent 
assembly as a demand that belonged to the underground 
and hence had no legitimacy.30 It was in this atmosphere 
of hostility to the Maoists that the peace talks of 2003 
commenced in Kathmandu. By the time they collapsed, 
the Kathmandu consensus against Maoist demands had 
weakened considerably. 
The Maoists have won some arguments but not legitimacy. 
The longer the king kept the parties out of power, the more 
the Maoist agenda began to be discussed openly. By 2004 
civil society seminars discussed ethnic and caste issues 
in relation to the limitations of the constitution and its 
institutions. Political leaders in their individual capacity 
conceded the need for a new constitution. There were 
discussions on the merits of proportional representation 
 
 
29 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal's Maoists, for an explanation 
of Prachandapath. 
30 On constitutional issues, including the rise in support for a 
constituent assembly, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, 
Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 
15 June 2005. 
and media commentaries on the failings of the system of 
governance after 1990. Not all these supported royal rule, 
and none advocated the Maoist cause. Yet, they were 
all discussing points of the Maoists’ agenda. These 
developments will not have been lost on the Maoists. The 
change of attitude in Kathmandu legitimised important 
Maoist demands but not their politics; nor did it give them 
a clear route to expanding their influence in the capital. 
Until February 2005, the Maoists had not resolved 
this conundrum – that even as their agenda gained 
acceptability, they themselves were left in the wilderness. 
As one observer of Maoist politics points out, “both 
politically and militarily they had reached their limits. 
Their influence in Nepal was not about to wane, but their 
legitimacy in Kathmandu was not about to grow either”.31 
It was partly for this reason that their repeated appeals to 
the parties for joint action met with a poor response, even 
after UML leader Madhav Nepal reportedly held talks 
with them in Lucknow, India, in the third week of 
November 2003.32 It is not certain what transpired at that 
meeting but a nine-point roadmap he proposed on 10 
January 2004 did not take on board long-standing Maoist 
demands.33 
The Maoists cannot take Kathmandu militarily, strangle 
it into economic collapse or hold it with their current 
troop strength even if they were to achieve a surprise 
victory. The only way forward for them is to influence it 
politically, as they did in 2003, with the threat of continued 
military action across the country as leverage. For this the 
Maoists need the mainstream political parties. Within their 
theoretical framework, they have to pursue united front 
tactics, which logically means aiming to complete the 
bourgeois democratic revolution against the palace in 
alliance with the political parties.34 
The parties were not likely to be tempted into such a united 
front as long as they believed the monarchy understood it 
would ultimately need their support to govern the country. 
The king’s February coup and his subsequent dismissive 
behaviour toward them called that assumption into serious 
 
 
31 Crisis Group interview, October 2005. 
32 Navin Singh Khadka, “Interpol goes after Nepal rebels”, 
BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/ 
3246066.stm. 
33 The roadmap only spoke of a government of all parliamentary 
parties, talks with the Maoists, an interim government, elections 
to parliament, and amendment or redrafting of the constitution 
by the new parliament by two-thirds majority. Amendment of 
the constitution through this procedure was clearly intended 
to reduce the role of the monarchy while thwarting any of 
the Maoists’ major reforms, which would be unlikely to gain a 
two-thirds majority, either directly or indirectly. 
34 Interview with Baburam Bhattarai, Washington Times, 30 
July 2005. 
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question and gave the Maoists for the first time a realistic 
opportunity for an alliance with internationally acceptable 
political forces. However, the Maoists are aware that the 
parties mistrust them for past betrayals and that mainstream 
leaders will still attempt to wring concessions from the 
king. These compulsions account for their haste in opening 
talks with the parties. By May-June 2005, the Maoist 
leadership had already worked out its terms for joint action. 
C. INTERNAL TENSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
The political compulsion for talks and a united front 
approach were perhaps reinforced by internal factors. 
There had been serious top-level disputes following the 
Maoists’ August 2004 plenum.35 By January 2005, these 
differences had led to disciplinary action against senior 
leaders including Baburam Bhattarai that adversely 
affected the morale of party cadres; there were rumours 
that Bhattarai sympathisers among party workers were 
preparing to leave the country for India. The Maoists 
initially denied but later admitted that action had been 
taken against him. 
Seven of the seventeen politburo members with voting 
rights disagreed with the decision to discipline Bhattarai,36 
and the differences between him and Prachanda could 
easily have crippled the party. It was obvious, however, 
that the Maoists could not afford internal power struggles 
at a time when the king had provided their first realistic 
opportunity for achieving a united front with the 
mainstream political parties. They had to resolve their 
leadership problem in order to gain the necessary 
confidence of those parties. 
The talks about the possibility of forming a united front, 
therefore, may have provided both the motive and the 
means for resolving the internal differences. The issue 
between Prachanda and Bhattarai was apparently whether 
to do a deal with the palace or with the parties. The August 
2004 plenum had concluded that “Indian expansionism”, 
backed by “U.S. imperialism”, was a major threat. 
Prachanda pointed to India’s arrest of leading Maoists and 
the historical “expansionist doctrine of Nehru” to argue 
that India wished to subjugate Nepal.37 Bhattarai countered 
that “the principle contradiction of the revolutionaries 
would be with the monarchy surviving on the strength of 
the royal army and the support of the imperialist and 
expansionist forces. This is a straightforward and crystal 
 
 
35 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal's Maoists, op.cit. 
36 Sudheer Sharma, “Baburamko visthapan”, Nepal, 27 March 
2005. 
37 Prachanda, press statement, 31 August 2004. 
clear question”.38 He harshly criticised those – implicitly 
including Prachanda – who were still “looking toward the 
monarchy with hopeful eyes”.39 
Since influential political commentators opposed to the 
palace also criticised the action taken against Bhattarai, 
it is likely that the settling of leadership problems 
simultaneously involved agreement on basic strategic 
issues. Bhattarai was authorised to participate in talks in 
New Delhi from May 2005 – including the discussions 
with Koirala in June – although his reinstatement to 
positions of party authority was only officially confirmed 
in August. Both Maoist leaders had agreed that they would 
treat the monarchy as the primary target of their movement, 
and they would keep an open mind about India. When 
Prachanda accompanied Bhattarai to high-level meetings 
in May, it was clear that their differences would not 
preclude a working relationship. 
Other constraints also pushed the Maoists towards talks. 
In the initial months after the royal coup, the king could 
have given in to international pressure and accommodated 
the parties. The Maoists may have been keen to push 
through a united front to pre-empt this possibility. The 
major constraint for the Maoists, however, is whether they 
can bring their cadres with them to accept a compromise. 
There have been persistent rumours, and some solid 
evidence, of command and control problems. Although 
the movement remains intact and fairly disciplined – the 
September ceasefire, for example, has not been perfectly 
observed but nor has it been grossly breached – more 
controversial party decisions may be harder to enforce. 
The November agreement with the parties requires party 
cadres to accept norms of behaviour imposed from above. 
As they now have to permit mainstream party workers 
to resume political activity in areas they dominate, their 
conduct will determine whether the leaders’ deal actually 
works on the ground. 
D. PREPARATION FOR TALKS 
The Maoists are well-prepared for talks, organisationally, 
theoretically and programmatically. An October 2005 
central committee plenary reportedly resolved all pending 
leadership differences.40 The old central committee was 
dissolved, and in its place a provisional general convention 
organisation committee has been constituted.41 This 
 
 
38 Baburam Bhattarai, thirteen-point note of dissent submitted 
to the CPN(M) central committee, 30 November 2004. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu and New Delhi, 
October 2005. 
41 “Maoists’ central committee dissolved”, People’s Review, 
31 October 2005. 
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convention is likely to be used to convey to the cadres the 
radical changes entailed by developments since February 
2005. In order to sell party workers on the talks with the 
parties, the concessions already made and likely to be 
made in future and the changes in strategy, the Maoists 
have decided to redouble ideological and political training. 
The restructuring is a major undertaking. The Maoists 
have decided to “demote” all party committees. The 
seven-member standing committee – formerly the highest 
decision-making body – has become the politburo; the 
seventeen former politburo members now make up the 
central committee, while the 100-odd central committee 
members have in turn been given responsibility for 
regional bureaus.42 The Maoists are also reshaping their 
military. They have formed four more army divisions, 
bringing the total to seven, and have appointed new 
commanders. Three senior divisional commanders – 
Pasang, Prabhakar and Ananta – have been reassigned 
to non-frontline tasks. They may be working to establish 
the “People's Military Academy”, which the plenum 
decided to set up to improve training.43 
The Maoist promise to cease “aggressive actions at the 
local level against people, friendly forces and political 
forces against regression” is a recognition that such 
attacks have not been productive. The dissolution of 
party committees and other command structures could be 
aimed at curbing the autonomy of lower-level leaders 
and improving the central leadership’s control, thereby 
smoothing the path to a deal with the parties. However, 
it is too early to interpret the motives behind this 
restructuring with any certainty. Whether they are 
serious about these measures or not, the Maoists are 
clearly trying to convince the parties that they mean 
business. There is still plenty of room for scepticism 
but on paper they have made more concessions than 
the parties. 
This seems to indicate that they are pinning hope on 
successful talks as a way of moving forward politically. 
However, their stand as talks progress beyond the minimal 
understanding reached in November 2005 will depend 
on the parties’ response. In return for the mainstream 
parties accepting an alliance with the objective of forming 
an interim government and electing a constituent assembly, 
the Maoists say they are prepared to make further 
substantial concessions. But they will expect any 
compromises on fundamental issues to be compensated 
for by benefits in other areas. 
 
 
42 "Maobadika pachhilla nirnay", Nepal, 27 November 2005. 
43 Crisis Group interviews, Nepal, October-November 2005. 
The Maoists have not yet made any public statement about 
their central committee meeting and its decisions. 
1. Domestic political acceptability 
The Maoists need to be accepted as a legitimate political 
force before they can consider laying down arms. 
Legitimacy is crucial from their point of view: it would 
help them consolidate politically before they disarm and 
demobilise. Their experience of “protracted people’s war” 
has taught them that winning power in the countryside 
is not sufficient. They need an alliance with the political 
parties if they are to gain the necessary acceptance in 
Kathmandu. They improved their public profile during 
the 2003 talks, and they will expect to build on this in 
any future negotiations. 
2. Allies 
From within a broad alliance against the palace, they 
will hope to cultivate important and durable allies for 
at least three reasons: 
 The king is unlikely to surrender power quickly. 
If he does agree to negotiate, he could appeal to 
the inherent conservatism of some forces in that 
alliance. For the Maoists to prevent excessive 
compromises, they need a coalition within the 
alliance that is aligned with their main agenda. They 
are not alone in believing that certain political 
party representatives conceded far too much to the 
palace in the 1990 constitution-making process. 
A reasonably drawn out campaign of agitation 
would help them cultivate the allies they need 
to guard against a repetition. 
 The Maoists will need negotiating allies before 
they definitively give up their underground 
existence. The process is likely to be long and 
could well be interrupted one or more times. Above-
ground allies who advocate their cause could help 
restart talks and smooth over obstacles. The Maoists 
know that the lack of influential above-ground 
allies puts insurgents at a disadvantage during 
negotiations, which is one reason why they have 
maintained more or less amicable relations with 
most above-ground forces. 
 Allies will be required even if negotiations lead to 
their full return to the mainstream. If the demand 
for a constituent assembly is secured, there will be 
an immediate realignment of political forces against 
the Maoists to neutralise their radical agenda. 
Should they fare poorly in the elections to the 
assembly, their achievements would be squandered 
and their aims thwarted. They thus need to 
cultivate long-term allies inside the alliance. 
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3. Pushing their agenda 
If the Maoists are seen to be giving away too much of their 
socio-economic agenda, they will have difficulty bringing 
their cadres along. Presenting issues in stark black and 
white terms has not prepared their followers for the messy 
process of compromise. The leadership can justify 
concessions by theoretical formulations such as the need 
to complete the bourgeois democratic revolution but these 
have little resonance among their foot soldiers, who have 
been at the sharp end of the armed conflict. Managing the 
transition from the black and white world of the insurgency 
to the grey zone of compromise will be hard. Maoist 
leaders know it will be easier if they can claim to have 
achieved many of their original demands. 
4. Building an urban base 
The Maoists could use an alliance with mainstream 
parties to penetrate urban areas, particularly Kathmandu, 
and influence public opinion. With their radical agenda 
and romantic image, they should stand a good chance of 
winning support among poor city-dwellers. Their grand 
plans for urban insurrection have not been realised but 
urbanisation in Nepal has not broken the connections 
between town and country, so with some allied help 
Maoist gains in rural areas could yet be transmitted 
to city residents alienated by the parliamentary parties. 
5. International image 
As long as the Maoists remain an underground organisation, 
no outside powers can formally accept them as a political 
force. However, if they manage to surround themselves 
with more acceptable company, international resistance 
may soften. Any such benefit would initially be incidental 
and heavily conditional upon further progress towards 
disarmament and visible commitment to mainstream 
politics. Nevertheless, it would provide an important new 
opening. 
IV. THE TALKS 
The parties and the Maoists are not evenly matched in 
political resources, clarity of vision, coherence of agenda 
and the will to move forward. Their talks have been 
tentative and stuttering, making quick progress in May 
2005, coming close to stalling in the late summer and then 
regaining some momentum in October. November saw the 
most dramatic progress, with a face-to-face meeting of 
senior Maoist and mainstream leaders in New Delhi 
and the formalising of a basic agreement. Nevertheless, 
this deal is fairly light on substance and debate on 
the most controversial issues has only been deferred. 
Whatever the symbolic value of this breakthrough, it 
does not in itself make agreement on thorny policy 
arguments any easier. 
The Maoists renewed their overtures to the political parties 
immediately following the February coup but it was 
almost four months before the first significant, publicly 
acknowledged meeting. This delay cannot be attributed 
solely to the main party leaders’ long detention and the 
Maoists’ internal problems. The primary block was a 
difference in approach to talks. The Maoists had already 
worked out the basic terms for a possible alliance by the 
time they held preliminary discussions with the NC 
leadership in June 2005. Their proposals, however, had 
not been formally approved by their own decision-making 
structures, a fact which prompted the mainstream leaders 
to demand clarification. Meanwhile, the parties were not 
prepared and had not fixed their positions. 
The contrasting Maoist and party perspectives on talks 
and joint action were clear in statements from Koirala and 
Maoist chairman Prachanda in April. On his release from 
detention on 1 April, the NC leader categorically ruled out 
talks with the Maoists.44 Prachanda, on the other hand, 
reiterated his appeal to the parties to unite against 
the autocratic monarchy on a minimum program of a 
constituent assembly and democratic republic. At the 
same time, he did not rule out talks with the king if he 
withdrew his 1 February proclamation and was prepared 
to allow elections for a constituent assembly. 
These statements cannot be taken simply at face value. 
Koirala was probably still hopeful the palace would 
accept his long-standing demand to restore the dissolved 
1999 parliament. Prachanda was hinting at the possibility 
of giving up the republican agenda if the king met some 
important Maoist demands. It could be that Koirala was 
looking for the best bargain and was trying to keep all 
options open. Alternatively, his apparent refusal to deal 
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with the Maoists may have been aimed at forcing them 
to offer better terms. Whatever the intention behind 
Prachanda’s statement, by May the Maoists had 
apparently resolved their internal problems and chosen 
their delegates for informal talks with the parties. Despite 
their indecisiveness, the parties were also leaning towards 
talks and willing to consider alternative approaches. 
A. FIRST MOVES 
The first publicly acknowledged discussions took place 
between Koirala and the Maoists in the second week of 
June 2005 in New Delhi.45 This high-level encounter 
had been preceded by complex talks about talks handled 
by other representatives and brokered by neutral 
intermediaries. The details have not been formally 
disclosed but the Maoists clearly made an offer worth 
considering. On 30 June the leaders of the seven-party 
alliance ruled out immediate talks with the king, with 
Koirala declaring they would negotiate instead with the 
Maoists to establish democracy and peace.46 On 5 July he 
announced that the alliance had decided the conflict 
should be resolved through “political means” and 
revealed that he had put a proposal to the Maoists on 
behalf of the alliance and was hoping for a positive 
response.47 However, contradictory signals came from 
individual party leaders.  
Periodic public statements were coordinated to give an 
impression of forward movement. On 18 June, the parties 
asked the Maoists to shun violence and not to disrupt the 
pro-democracy movement; the following day Prachanda 
issued a statement that the Maoists would not carry out 
physical action against any unarmed person. On 11 July, 
the Maoists considered “very positively the public 
expression to have a dialogue” and invited the parties to 
build an “authentic team” for this with a view to finding a 
political solution.48 A week later they emphasised that 
they would show maximum flexibility to attain total 
democracy.49 On 22 July, Madhav Nepal said that the 
Maoists did not have to lay down arms before negotiating 
 
 
45 This was their first meeting after February 2005 but not 
the first ever: Koirala held face-to-face talks with Prachanda 
and Baburam Bhattarai in New Delhi in April 2002. 
46 “Parties rule out immediate talks with king”, Kantipur Online, 
30 June 2005. On 15 June, second rung leaders of the major 
political parties had already indicated that an agreement with the 
king was not possible. “Agreement with king impossible”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 16 June 2005. 
47 “King reluctant to resolve Maoist problem: Koirala”, 
Kantipur Online, 5 July 2005. 
48 “Rebels invite parties for talks”, The Kathmandu Post, 12 
July 2005.  
49 “Dr Bhattarai, others reinstated”, The Kathmandu Post, 19 
July 2005.  
with the seven-party alliance50 but within two days the 
parties demanded that they clarify their stand on multiparty 
democracy, stop targeting educational institutions and 
refrain from extortion.51 
On 27 July, Prachanda announced that the Maoists were 
“prepared to take any decision” to reinstate “the people’s 
sovereign right and the development of a new political 
mainstream”.52 He also declared that instructions had 
been issued that leaders and workers of the political 
parties should not be targeted.53 On the same day – before 
the central leadership had even decided on taking the talks 
forward – local party units in Humla agreed with the 
Maoist unit in the district to form an alliance.54 Apart 
from giving a sense of forward momentum, the talks 
demonstrated a professional approach to the mechanics 
of dialogue. Despite practical difficulties, the two sides 
managed not to push each other too far too fast and not to 
raise public expectations of an instant deal. 
By August, the UML had moved closer to some of the 
Maoists’ non-negotiable minimum issues – a republican 
agenda and an interim government. Its ninth central 
committee meeting (15-28 August) decided to work 
towards “absolute democracy”, including a democratic 
republic through a constituent assembly.55 The NC, while 
not adopting republicanism, dropped its commitment 
to constitutional monarchy.56 Prachanda noted in an 
interview that “objectively our party has taken the NC’s 
decision to remove constitutional monarchy from their 
party constitution and go ahead for constituent assembly 
and the UML’s decision that they could go up to [a] 
democratic republic through [a] constituent assembly as 
positive”.57 The stage looked set for more progress. 
B. STUMBLING BLOCKS 
For the dialogue to go further, two important gaps had 
to be bridged. First, the parties were not going to align 
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themselves en masse with the Maoist demand for a 
republic. The NC, UML and other members of the seven-
party alliance were willing to sign up to a constituent 
assembly (though it was not their first preference) but not 
to commit themselves further. Secondly, they continued 
to call for restoration of the 1999 parliament as the first 
step both to potential reconciliation with the palace and to 
peace talks with the Maoists.58 
The Maoists were unwilling to compromise on either 
point.59 By mid-August progress towards formal talks 
was stuttering. The seven-party alliance expressed 
unhappiness with the conduct of Maoist cadres and 
said it would seek civil society’s help to assess the 
implementation of commitments.60 Individual mainstream 
leaders also began to speak against talks. Shailaja 
Acharya argued that “the two types of polarisations – 
king's active monarchy and republicanism – [are] 
weakening the middle path of the Nepali Congress”.61 
Ram Sharan Mahat, a prominent NC leader and party 
spokesperson, also opposed talks with the Maoists until 
they disarmed. 
Meetings between the Maoists and mid-level party 
representatives continued, primarily in New Delhi,62 
as did telephone discussions.63 But policy differences 
were not the only problem. From the earliest stages 
of talks about talks, the process itself had presented 
challenges. NC-Maoist dialogue provided the initial 
momentum, and some in the NC camp were ready to 
press ahead to a quick deal regardless of other parties’ 
interests. While their high-level meetings proceeded, 
the UML was left out of the loop, despite the presence 
of at least one senior leader in New Delhi.64 
Informal facilitators were essential for enabling the first 
talks but their role also aroused suspicions, and some 
UML politicians were concerned that they were being 
sidelined.65 The tensions hinted at further problems, and 
by October 2005 it was the NC that faced the prospect 
of being sidelined by a faster UML-Maoist track. 
 
 
58 The constitutional and political aspects of the demand for 
restoration of the 1999 House of Representatives are discussed 
in Crisis Group Report, The Constitutional Issues, op. cit. 
59 The divisions on republicanism and the restoration of 
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63 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, September 2005. 
64 Crisis Group interviews with talks facilitators and observers, 
New Delhi, May and June 2005. 
65 Crisis Group interviews with UML central committee 
members, Kathmandu, June 2005. 
Meanwhile, the carefully separated lines of 
communication hinted at internal rivalries: NC central 
committee members Krishna Sitaula and Shekhar 
Koirala dealt with Maoist leaders Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara and Baburam Bhattarai respectively.66 G.P. 
Koirala and Prachanda thereby ensured that they alone 
had access to all channels of information. 
C. CEASEFIRE AND BEYOND 
The Maoists’ September ceasefire declaration was 
primarily a goodwill gesture designed to allay domestic 
and international apprehensions and build some trust with 
other forces. According to Prachanda, the ceasefire was 
intended to “encourage all forces within and outside 
Nepal who want peace through a forward moving 
political solution”.67 The declaration explicitly stated that 
the ceasefire had been announced with the “aim of doing 
away with doubts remaining in some circles” and creating 
a “positive environment…to solve the problem from the 
political forces inside the country to the UN”.68 It also 
hinted at the political problems outlined above when 
it stated that restoration of parliament would serve 
no purpose, and hence an interim government and 
constituent assembly were the only way to move forward 
politically.69 
The Maoist central committee also reportedly adopted a 
resolution which addresses three critical issues of import 
to the seven-party alliance: commitment to multiparty 
democracy; review of all cases of harassment and 
terrorising of political opponents and ordinary citizens 
and punishment of responsible cadres; and recognition 
that armed insurrection is unsustainable and an 
understanding with the political parties about a constituent 
assembly is needed.70 
The ceasefire and the central committee resolution have 
had some impact, and the talks may be regaining 
momentum. Senior UML leader Bamdev Gautam had 
successful discussions with the Maoists in Rolpa in 
October 2005.71 They reached an agreement on basic 
common goals, and the Maoists guaranteed the safety of 
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the UML’s political workers.72 Madhav Nepal emphasised 
that political parties “have taken the initiative for a dialogue 
with the Maoists so that they can adopt a peaceful political 
path”.73 He also clarified that his party did not expect 
the Maoists to disarm immediately but a “political 
process…would lead to the disarming and 
decommissioning of arms”.74 Nevertheless, he later 
asserted that the Maoists were willing to disarm under 
UN auspices.75 
D. INDIA’S ROLE 
Since February 2005 India has been more openly 
sympathetic to the political parties than some other 
external powers. Its longstanding public commitment has 
been to multiparty democracy, constitutional monarchy – 
and strong counter-insurgency measures. However, it 
lacks faith in the RNA’s capacity to contain the Maoists 
and has become increasingly frustrated with Gyanendra. 
India has always maintained multiple channels of 
communication, and these may have been used to smooth 
the initial party-Maoist talks of May-June 2005. Indeed, 
one newspaper report claimed the entire process was 
managed by Indian intelligence agencies.76 This is 
probably an exaggeration but senior Maoist leaders did 
stay in New Delhi for some time and met Indian political 
leaders.77 
The presence of many Nepali politicians in the Indian 
capital during Girija Koirala’s visit in early June – and his 
admission that he had talked with the Maoists – hint 
at India’s approval of the dialogue. A prominent New 
Delhi analyst observed that “there is a suspicion here that 
perhaps G.P. Koirala’s overtures towards the Maoists 
have India’s acquiescence if not blessings”.78 The 
repeated visits of Prachanda, who is highly security 
conscious and rarely moves outside the Maoist heartland 
areas of mid-western Nepal, suggest the Maoist leadership 
has good reason not to feel at risk of arrest. India’s first 
public response to the November agreement coyly 
noted that “we have seen newspaper reports about an 
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77 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu and New Delhi, May-
June 2005. 
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understanding between the Maoists and the political 
parties in Nepal” but it is unlikely senior officials and 
politicians were surprised.79 
The Indian government has remained tight-lipped but the 
meetings are unlikely to have taken place without official 
knowledge. New Delhi was also the location for the first 
acknowledged talks and the most recent round involving 
the Maoists, NC, UML and Janamorcha. Some 
Kathmandu-based leaders believe the talks were delayed 
because India had advised the NC to prepare a roadmap.80 
Madhav Nepal spent three weeks in India (23 October-12 
November 2005), including a visit to Andhra Pradesh 
where he discussed the local Maoist situation with the 
state’s home minister.81 While in New Delhi he announced 
a roadmap to cover the basic aspects of the transition to a 
new system in Nepal. 
While India has allowed certain forms of Nepali political 
activity on its soil, it lacks a policy consensus. The 
differing interests and attitudes of the home, defence and 
external affairs ministries have sometimes been all too 
publicly visible. In general, the home ministry and 
security officials have been more hawkish, while the 
external affairs ministry has taken a broader view of the 
conflict’s political context. The roles of other agencies, 
including the internal and external intelligence services, 
have been the subject of much more speculation but there 
are no indications of either a grand conspiracy or a 
comprehensive long-term strategy.82 For the time being, 
however, India’s apparent willingness to play the role of 
guarantor has boosted the parties’ confidence in a 
dialogue which they had previously considered too risky. 
Indian involvement – as long as it remains tactful and not 
overly self-interested – increases the possibility of an 
acceptable compromise. The political parties have always 
cultivated Indian goodwill when in government and on 
occasion have sought its assistance to gain power. The 
Maoists have criticised such behaviour and railed against 
Indian expansionism but recognise the need to win New 
Delhi over. India’s opposition prevents them from seizing 
power, and its refusal to grant them legitimacy stymies 
their hopes for political progress. While this has heightened 
their anti-Indian rhetoric, it has also prompted a more 
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pragmatic reassessment of the need to engage with New 
Delhi. 
Maoist statements of 2004 and 2005 have consistently 
stressed the desire to move forward politically. Since 
Indian support for a hard-line military approach had 
thwarted their political progress, they will welcome any 
change in New Delhi’s thinking. As the present dialogue 
is the best political entry vehicle they are likely to get, 
they have good reason to agree and adhere to a reasonable 
agenda. Likewise, the present situation probably offers 
India its best opportunity to broker a political solution. 
V. THE AGREEMENT 
A. THE DELHI MEETING 
The UML’s October initiatives presaged the most 
significant moves since the dialogue began. At the start of 
November a flurry of meetings and contacts between the 
Maoists and party representatives indicated preparations 
for face-to-face discussions. On 16 November Madhav 
Nepal, who had only returned to Kathmandu four days 
earlier, abruptly set off for India once again. Rumours 
were fuelled by the simultaneous New Delhi visits of 
Indian ambassador Shiv Mukherjee and U.S. ambassador 
James Moriarty. United Nations Department of Political 
Affairs envoy Tamrat Samuel and UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights’ Nepal office head Ian Martin also 
arrived in Delhi on 18 November. However, suspicions 
that these outside players were set to join the Maoists and 
parties in their face-to-face discussions were unfounded.83 
The crucial meeting was held in Delhi on 17 November. 
The party participants were Girija Prasad Koirala and 
Krishna Sitaula of the NC, the UML’s Madhav Nepal and 
K.P. Oli, Amik Sherchan of Janamorcha and Narayan Kaji 
Shrestha (Comrade Prakash) of its underground wing, 
Unity Centre-Masal. The Maoists were represented by 
their three most powerful leaders – Prachanda, Baburam 
Bhattarai and Krishna Bahadur Mahara. The topics 
discussed were referred back to the other members of the 
seven-party alliance for their consideration.84 Apparently 
the basic terms agreed in New Delhi were acceptable 
to all. 
At the table, the Maoists agreed in principle to multiparty 
democracy, respect for human rights (including political 
freedoms) and eventual disarmament while all parties 
agreed to work towards a constituent assembly.85 The 
question of restoration of parliament was more problematic 
and the difficulty of finding common ground led to it being 
deferred. Beyond the items included in the published 
agreement, more detailed discussions did take place on 
(a) what the program of joint action against “autocratic 
monarchy” would entail and (b) the constitution and 
mandate of a joint monitoring committee, consisting of 
lower-level party and Maoist officials, to meet on a more 
regular basis to coordinate action and deal with any 
tensions. However, these issues were too complex for 
immediate consensus. 
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B. ACHIEVEMENTS 
Participants denied that the Delhi meeting took place, and 
for five days they did not comment publicly on the shape 
of a possible agreement. When the mainstream parties 
and Prachanda issued parallel press statements on 22 
November announcing their twelve-point agreement it 
was hailed in some quarters as a major breakthrough. The 
deal includes some concrete points of consensus which 
provide the basis for the peace process:86 
 The monarchy. The parties and Maoists have 
reached a firm common view: “We completely 
agree that autocratic monarchy is the main hurdle 
in (realising) this. It is our clear view that without 
establishing absolute democracy by ending 
autocratic monarchy, there is no possibility of 
peace, progress and prosperity in the country”; 
 Ending the conflict. The agreement recognises 
that “the country has demanded the establishment 
of permanent peace along with a positive solution 
to the armed conflict” and both sides commit 
themselves to “ending autocratic monarchy and the 
existing armed conflict, and establishing permanent 
peace in the country”. The Maoists make an explicit 
commitment “to move along the new peaceful 
political stream through this process”; 
 Political pluralism. The agreement formalises the 
Maoist offer to enter a multiparty political system. 
They offer a “public institutional commitment” to 
“democratic norms and values like the competitive 
multiparty system of governance, civil liberties, 
human rights, the concept of the rule of law, 
fundamental rights, etc.”; 
 Constituent assembly. The agreement specifies 
an elected assembly as the accepted forum for all 
sides to debate the constitutional revisions that will 
shape the new set-up; 
 Accepting past mistakes. The parties and Maoists 
both admit to past shortcomings and promise to 
improve their behaviour, while reaffirming their 
commitment “to fully respect the norms and values 
of human rights and press freedom and move ahead 
accordingly”; and 
 External help. Both sides call for impartial outside 
assistance, led by the United Nations “or any other 
reliable international supervision”, in supervising 
elections and overseeing the cantonment of state 
and Maoist forces. 
 
 
86 The Maoist-party agreement is reproduced in full in 
Appendix B. 
C. SHORTCOMINGS 
While the agreement is certainly a significant development 
the document is as notable for what it does not say as for 
what it does. Its studiously ambivalent stance on some key 
issues, and silence on others, indicates the challenges 
that still remain in forging a wider common platform: 
 The preamble mentions “problems related to class, 
caste, gender, region, etc. of all sectors including 
political, economic, social and cultural” but there is 
no indication that any policies to deal with these 
problems have been discussed, let alone agreed; 
 The much heralded Maoist offer to “disarm” is not 
there in print. The most the Maoists have so far 
committed themselves to is the cantonment of their 
arms, along with those of the RNA, during elections 
to a constituent assembly and there is no timetable 
for permanent decommissioning of weapons. 
Nevertheless, Madhav Nepal has insisted that no 
joint action with the Maoists will be undertaken 
until they have disarmed, a position that seems to 
contradict the spirit of the agreement;87 
 On the key questions of republicanism, the shape 
of future democratic institutions and the means 
of getting there – whether via restoration of 
parliament or moving straight to an interim 
government – the parties and Maoists have only 
got as far as agreeing to disagree. The “agreement” 
reiterates both sides’ mutually incompatible 
proposals and promises “continue[d] dialogue…to 
find a common understanding”.88 However, the 
commitment of “ending autocratic monarchy” 
holds out the prospect of a Maoist concession on 
accepting a limited monarchy; 
 Commitments to human rights and political 
pluralism are expressed repeatedly (points 4, 5 and 
8 are largely overlapping) but such statements are 
nothing new, and there are few extra details on how 
they will be put into practice, although the Maoist 
offer to return “home, land and property [of other 
party activists] seized in an unjust manner” seems 
to be a concrete gesture; 
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 Both the parties and the Maoists admit to past 
mistakes and commit themselves not to repeat such 
mistakes again. This admission is important but the 
“mistakes” are not specified, and no concrete steps 
towards improved behaviour are outlined. 
The follow-up actions of both sides may yet address these 
gaps and challenges. With their unilateral ceasefire due to 
expire on 3 December 2005, the Maoists have a chance 
to demonstrate goodwill with an extension, this time 
possibly without a time limit. Other substantive issues, 
however, can only be dealt with by continued negotiations 
and hard bargaining. 
D. THE AGENDA TO COME 
The November 2005 agreement thus still leaves many 
issues to be discussed and does not do much to clarify 
questions of process. The task of formulating an agenda 
for further talks would be simpler if the mainstream 
parties themselves were clearer about where they stand. 
This requires negotiations among themselves as well as 
with the Maoists. Reaching a compromise means finding 
middle ground that is broad enough to include everyone’s 
minimum positions on fundamental issues as well as the 
right terminology to describe it. For the seven-party 
alliance to work this out on its own and then search for 
common ground with the Maoists would be simpler than 
trying to find everyone’s middle ground simultaneously. 
The major immediate challenge for the parties is to work 
out, at a minimum, a two-phase agenda – the first to deal 
with the period up to the achievement of the agreed 
minimum objectives, the second to deal with the 
basic protocols and modalities for initiating the interim 
government. The agenda for the first phase is likely to be 
easier to formulate since the second phase involves tricky 
issues of administration during the difficult period of 
demobilising the Maoist troops and dismantling Maoist 
parallel governments.89 In both phases, fundamental 
differences of position, outlined below, will need to be 
addressed. 
Progress in the negotiations, of course, will depend not 
only on each side’s objectives but also on how each wants 
to move forward. The talks so far – and the public 
statements that have emerged from them – have gone 
some way towards clarifying the shared goals around 
which an agreement could coalesce. Less attention has 
been paid to process. The Maoists have been more 
consistent in their stated demands and goals but they have 
 
 
89 The second phase will be particularly difficult because the 
state’s structures have been greatly weakened in the Maoists’ 
rural strongholds. 
not indicated how they envisage achieving them and how 
the process of engagement with the parties can minimise 
the risks of renewed conflict. 
1. Republic or “full democracy”? 
The UML has moved to support republican democracy 
but has also left room for those unwilling to join an openly 
republican platform. According to Madhav Nepal, “the 
only choice before the people is ceremonial monarchy 
with the army under the executive and parliament being 
supreme, or a republic. Our party has decided that we 
are for a democratic republic”.90 This to some extent 
addresses the problem faced by the NC. Girija Prasad 
Koirala has expressed contradictory opinions, hoping 
perhaps to be all things to all wings of his party. 
Nevertheless, his loose formulation of “full democracy” 
is a potential compromise. Prachanda responded by 
welcoming the mainstream parties shift in stance – 
noting in particular that the UML’s revised democratic 
republican policy offered an “even stronger political 
basis for cooperation”91– but still calling for a positive 
commitment to a constituent assembly. 
“Full democracy” may be a flexible enough term to gain 
broad acceptance and it is this formulation that is used to 
describe the seven-party position in the November 
agreement with the Maoists. For Koirala, it appears to 
mean less than republicanism; for others it includes 
republicanism. Since all participants in the talks have 
agreed to a constituent assembly, the democratic method 
of settling the question would be to debate and vote on it 
in that forum. If the anti-monarchists feel reasonably 
confident of victory, they could find a way of ensuring 
that pro-monarchy democrats in the NC do not rebel 
against Koirala if he has to join the republicans. “Full 
democracy” would likely encompass a range of meanings 
– not more than a multiparty republic and not less than a 
constituent assembly. If this can be managed, the talks 
can move to other issues. 
2. Restoration of parliament 
Another persistent problem is the demand for the 
restoration of parliament, to which the Maoists are 
vehemently opposed. If the sole aim of the restoration is 
to help in the formation of an interim government, there 
is good reason for the Maoists’ opposition, since they 
would have no representation in the restored house. In 
 
 
90 Quoted in Bharat Bhushan, op. cit. The UML faces a further 
internal debate over whether its concept of multiparty people’s 
democracy (bahudaliya janvad) can be reconciled with the aim 
of a democratic republic (loktantrik ganatantra) that has gained 
currency among activists across the democratic mainstream. 
91 Press statement, 3 September 2005. 
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Madhav Nepal’s view, “either the platform of a restored 
parliament or an all-party conference could be used 
to form an interim government that would have full 
executive and legislative powers. The 1990 constitution 
could be adopted with some modifications as an interim 
option until a new statute was framed”.92 
The UML’s suggestion of an all-party conference could 
be a way out, especially as not all seven parties are 
strongly committed to the restoration demand. Another 
option would be to revive the house for a limited period 
for the specific purpose of amending the provisions that 
by mutual consent are the most undesirable. Once this 
was done, the house could dissolve itself and the interim 
government could proceed with the second phase of 
transition to a new arrangement under the amended 
constitution. Political acceptability and practical feasibility 
would make a strong case to overcome narrow legal 
objections.93 There is no reason to hold up an agreement 
on the largely procedural issue of parliament restoration 
other than to buy time. 
Here again, the wording of the agreement skirts the issue: 
the parties’ continued call for parliamentary restoration is 
acknowledged but Maoist opposition – and preference to 
move directly to an interim government – is also stated. 
3. Other sticking points 
If talks proceed beyond these two threshold issues, the 
negotiation of other parts of the Maoist agenda will throw 
up fresh challenges. Some of the more significant include: 
 Land reform. Maoist plans for significant land 
reform have widespread support, including from 
mainstream politicians. But radical redistribution 
would probably upset key party activists: many of 
the major parties’ local and district leaders are 
from relatively prosperous small to medium 
landholding backgrounds and might find their 
interests threatened. 
 Ethnic, caste and gender issues. Here, too, the 
Maoist agenda has forced broader recognition of 
systemic social and economic inequality and 
mainstream commitments in principle to act. But 
the parties always avoided these issues when in 
office, and their relatively conservative leaderships 
will find it hard to reach a consensus. 
 Institutions and elections. The Maoists envisage 
a thorough restructuring of the state from its central 
 
 
92 Quoted in Bharat Bhushan, op. cit. 
93 The political and legal ramifications of such a scenario are 
discussed in Crisis Group Report, The Constitutional Issues, 
op. cit. 
organs to the local level. Mainstream parties have 
recognised the need for some changes but will 
hesitate to endorse dramatic reconfiguration. The 
Maoist push for regional autonomy will, therefore, 
present a thorny issue. So too will the question of 
electoral systems, with some parties preferring to 
retain first-past-the-post and others pushing for 
proportional representation or other methods. 
 Economic policy. The Maoists appear to prefer a 
mixed economy rather than a pure Stalinist-style 
command version.94 Such models were tried in 
various non-communist, decolonised countries 
after 1945 but the major mainstream parties, 
whatever their ideological background, have 
largely endorsed more liberal policies. They would 
find it difficult to accept Maoist programs such as 
nationalisation, especially in the face of likely 
international disapproval. 
Certain issues can be reserved for discussion at a later 
stage. If there is agreement on a constituent assembly, it 
would become the logical forum for elected representatives 
to debate the shape of state institutions, affirmative action 
on inequality and similar topics. But the process of election 
to such an assembly would be hotly debated in its own 
right and could not be deferred. On other parts of their 
agenda, the Maoists may feel the need to assure their 
cadres that action will be taken but the parties may find 
it impossible to agree to specific policies. Deciding which 
issues the two sides can agree to disagree on will not be 
easy. 
4. Monitoring methods 
Any agreement will have to be monitored under a mutually 
acceptable but effective mechanism. The parties and 
Maoists may be able to develop a code of conduct but 
monitoring would require third party involvement. As the 
party-Maoist dialogue is effectively an act of opposition 
to the royal government, monitoring an agreement would 
be politically sensitive. Beyond the silent and relatively 
passive role that India is playing – and which no other 
state is in a position to play – international assistance is 
hard to envisage. Without palace buy-in to a broader peace 
process, there will no doubt be attempts to undermine 
prospects of a bilateral deal. The November agreement 
states that “[a]n understanding has been reached to settle 
any problem emerging between the parties through 
peaceful dialogue at the concerned level or at the 
leadership level”. However, such a mechanism – even if it 
has been thought out more thoroughly than its brief public 
mention implies – is unlikely to be sufficient in itself. 
 
 
94 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit. 
Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists 
Crisis Group Asia Report Nº106, 28 November 2005 Page 20 
 
 
 
 
The seven-party alliance has already suggested forming a 
team of eminent persons to verify Maoist adherence to the 
preconditions for talks.95 An expanded non-partisan team 
appointed by consensus could assume a broader role but 
serious difficulties loom. The composition, logistics and 
authority of such a team are all potentially controversial. 
Civil society figures agreeing to participate would take 
personal and political risks. Nevertheless, despite being 
one of the most sensitive and complex topics for 
negotiation, a monitoring mechanism is one of the most 
pressing. If it is not agreed at an early stage, the two sides 
could easily fall out in the course of any joint activities. 
The strength, creativity and determination of Nepal’s civil 
society may be put to the test. The question of external 
mediation or facilitation – viewed by many diplomats as a 
prerequisite if talks are not to founder as before – has 
been left open. 
5. Can they compromise? 
The mainstream parties and the Maoists are struggling, 
in effect, to build an alliance that spans almost the entire 
ideological spectrum. Such an effort is bound to run into 
difficulties. The vision and democratic commitment of 
both sides will be severely tested. An agreement offers 
the scope for ending the ten year old conflict but the 
price of compromise could be high for both sides. 
Within the parties there is already some potential for 
bridging divides. The UML and the Janamorcha occupy 
the middle ground, with the former having interests closer 
to those of the NC and the latter leaning more towards 
the Maoists. These two could play a mediating role in 
persuading the NC to make concessions. At the same time, 
they have most to fear in electoral terms if the Maoists 
join the mainstream so will be careful about giving away 
too much. Unfortunately for the mainstream parties, the 
search for compromises is likely to expose their own 
mutual distrust. Managing this will be crucial, especially 
if the Maoists maintain their own unity. 
6. Where next? 
Even if the Maoists and the parties overcome their 
differences and form a loose alliance, what will they then 
do and where will it lead? They may agree to a constituent 
assembly as a route to peace but the king and army are 
unlikely to come on board. A united party-Maoist 
combination would still face the challenge of pressuring 
the palace into a reasonable compromise or pushing all 
out for an end to the monarchy. In either case it is hard 
to envisage the RNA remaining a silent spectator. 
 
 
95 “Civil society mediation possible”, The Kathmandu Post, 
22 August 2005. 
Assuming the king is not forced into immediate 
acquiescence, the parties and Maoists will likely engage 
in a program of joint action. The form this would take is 
not clear. The thrust of such action would be political but 
it would be reasonable to infer that the Maoists would 
back the campaign with military force. This might be 
limited to offering a protective shield to agitation in the 
districts or could be extended to complementary offensive 
action. In either case, the risk of resumed, even intensified 
conflict is real, as is the possibility that non-violent party 
political workers may choose not to participate in a 
movement with an implicit armed wing. 
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VI. REACTIONS 
A. PLAYERS NOT AT THE TABLE 
Other forces, within Nepal and beyond, will have an 
important part in shaping the future of party-Maoist 
dialogue. Talks could not have proceeded this far without 
India’s tacit approval. However, the U.S. has repeatedly 
and forcefully expressed its opposition. The parties face a 
difficult choice: they cannot satisfy both India’s unstated 
preference and the U.S.’s stated preference, nor can they 
easily compromise between them. Since New Delhi’s 
influence in Nepal far exceeds that of Washington, the 
talks may proceed further. But compared to India’s opaque 
approach, American diplomats have made a clear and 
consistent case. Other international forces – assuming 
China’s stated interest in assisting both India and Nepal 
to eradicate Maoism is not translated into much more 
concrete action96 – have less influence and also less 
strategic interest in the country. 
Within Nepal, pro-palace politicians and commentators 
have led criticism of the dialogue, although the major 
royalist parties have been circumspect in their public 
comments, clearly not wishing to distance themselves too 
far from the potential new party-Maoist alliance. Others 
who are excluded from the talks process – civil society, 
journalists and lawyers and the like – have been more 
vocally, though far from unanimously, supportive of the 
effort to find some common ground. Initial reactions to 
the November agreement have been divided along similar 
lines. 
The first official statement came from the information 
minister, Tanka Dhakal, who promised that the government 
would take time to study the agreement but also warned 
that it was the product of foreign intervention.97 He 
further cautioned that any understanding would have to be 
“in favour of the king’s 1 February move”.98 His complaint 
about external interference was echoed by Foreign Minister 
Ramesh Nath Pandey, who said that steps towards peace 
were welcome but that if they came at the urging of 
 
 
96 The Chinese ambassador raised hackles in New Delhi when 
he stated: “If there is any help [you expect] from us to India to 
get rid of [your own Maoists], we will try to do our best”. The 
Times of India, 26 October 2005. Chinese military aid to Nepal 
– though relatively small at around $1 million – has discomfited 
some U.S. and Indian officials and independent analysts. 
97 “‘Foreigners’ behind the party-Maoist understanding: 
Dhakal”, nepalnews.com, 23 November 2005. 
98 “Parties-Maoist pact unnatural, at behest of foreigners: 
Ministers”, The Kathmandu Post, 24 November 2005. 
outsiders it could not be in Nepal’s best interests.99 
Another minister dismissed the agreement as “like an ant 
biting an elephant”.100 Once the government had 
considered what line to take, Tanka Dhakal firmly 
rejected the option of a constituent assembly and insisted 
that municipal and general elections would be held 
in line with the king’s directives. He also hinted at 
the government’s uncompromising mood by referring to 
the Maoists as terrorists.101 
B. THE CASE AGAINST DIALOGUE 
Various domestic forces, with different motivations, 
were opposed to the party-Maoist dialogue from the 
outset and have reacted negatively to the November 
agreement. These include pro-palace groups such as the 
RPP, the Rashtriya Janashakti Party and the NSP and 
also individuals within the Nepali Congress, UML and 
NC (D). They tried to influence public opinion against 
talks but there was little they could do directly to stymie 
progress in the absence of a more concerted palace 
scheme. International players, in particular the U.S., 
perhaps have had more influence.102 But those who 
argued against talks are now rethinking their options in 
the light of more rapid progress than they had expected. 
Sections of the Kathmandu elite are concerned that the 
parties may grant the Maoists too many concessions on 
fundamental issues of state and economic restructuring. 
Others may not object to reform per se but remain 
suspicious of Maoist intentions and unconvinced that they 
will give up the goal of a one-party dictatorship. Those 
among the intelligentsia who oppose a politically active 
monarchy but fear the Maoists – a sizeable constituency – 
face a dilemma, since they are aware that the parties on 
their own cannot force the palace to back down. They 
have not been able to propose a serious alternative to 
dealing with the Maoists, particularly since diplomatic 
and economic pressures have yet to move the king. 
The proposal for a ceremonial monarchy was an attempt 
to find a middle way between a monarchical system and a 
republic that could unite parties and palace against the 
Maoists. But this has been blocked by the palace’s refusal 
to contemplate a ceremonial role, or indeed any reduction 
of influence. Some respected analysts have argued that a 
 
 
99 “Dal-maobadi samjhautaprati sarkar gambhir”, Kantipur, 
24 November 2005. 
100 “Only an ant bite: Minister”, People’s News, 22 November 
2005. 
101 “Govt rejects constituent assembly; insists on holding 
election”, nepalnews.com, 25 November 2005. 
102 For international players and interests, see Crisis Group 
Briefing, Beyond Royal Rule, op. cit. 
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ceremonial monarchy is in any case impossible. “The 
Hindu king in Nepal either will stay absolute or there will 
be a republic”, says U.S.-based commentator Chitra 
Tiwari. “There is no middle way”.103 Nevertheless, the 
concept of ceremonial monarchy – however impractical – 
will tempt the parties not to align with the Maoist demand 
for a republic. 
The palace and the RNA are hostile to talks that could 
herald a polarisation that would jeopardise their power. 
Though the palace has not offered the parties anything 
concrete, the king and some ministers have invited them 
for conversation.104 The royalist political parties remain 
loyal to the monarchy at heart, even if their leaders are 
sincerely worried that the king’s actions have put the 
institution at risk. The interests they represent have lost 
the hold on political institutions they had under the 
monarchical Panchayat system of 1962–1990. Their 
criticism of the February coup has been measured and is 
at least partially attributable to the fact that the new 
government has not accommodated them. They are 
aware that the party-Maoist convergence may isolate 
them even as the king withholds favours. Since they are 
structurally unable to embrace radical reforms, and it is 
unlikely the Maoists would accept them, their dismay at 
the talks and the November deal is logical. 
The most significant and consistent opposition has come 
from Washington. While critical of the palace, it has 
repeatedly urged the political parties to cooperate with the 
king. The parliamentary parties are well aware of the risks 
of dealing with the Maoists but they are no longer so ready 
to play a subordinate role of facilitating a palace-led 
military campaign. As the party-Maoist dialogue gathered 
pace, the U.S. embassy stated that it “notes with alarm 
recent reports [in] Nepal media on the emerging potential 
for an 'alliance' between one or more of the major political 
parties and the Maoist rebels”.105 This was forcefully 
reiterated by the U.S. ambassador in interviews as he 
visited eastern and western districts of Nepal,106 although 
American reaction to the November agreement – discussed 
below – has been more measured. 
 
 
103 Chitra Tiwari, “Red star over the Himalayas”, Current 
History, September 2005, p. 296. 
104 “Government ready for talks with parties: Dr Giri”, 
nepalnews.com, 3 October 2005. 
105 “Embassy warns against Maoists-parties ‘alliance’”, 
U.S. embassy press release, 4 November 2005, available at 
http://nepal.usembassy.gov/pr_11-04-2005.html. 
106 For example, a report from Dhankuta noted that “[t]he U.S. 
Ambassador also wanted to know about any collaboration 
between the district-level Maoists and the political parties” and 
reiterated that the palace and parties should unite. “U.S. envoy 
at Dhankuta Appellate Court”, Kantipur Online, 10 November 
2005. 
C. SUPPORT FROM THE SIDELINES 
Support for the agreement has come from various quarters, 
most notably peace activists, professionals such as 
lawyers and journalists, and various civil society groups. 
Nepal’s largest selling English daily newspaper hailed 
the “groundbreaking agreement” as “an unprecedented 
and remarkable effort to establish a lasting peace” and 
praised the parties’ and Maoists’ “political acumen”.107 
Organisations such as the Professional Alliance for Peace 
and Democracy (PAPAD), Federation of Nepalese 
Journalists (FNJ), Tribhuvan University Teachers' 
Association, Citizen's Solidarity for Peace, Nepal Press 
Union, Human Rights and Peace Society and Nepal 
Student Forum were quick to welcome the accord.108 
U.S.-based Nepali organisations gave a similar response.109 
Civil society does not have much direct power but even 
the Maoists have acknowledged the role played by 
influential individuals like Devendra Raj Pandey.110 In 
August the seven-party alliance declared that it would 
seek the support of civil society for the talks, and the 
November agreement calls on “civil society, professional 
organizations, various wings of parties, people of all 
communities and regions, press and intellectuals” to 
support a joint movement. 
Now that the talks have made progress, calculations will 
change. Even the royalist parties could adjust their carefully 
modulated criticism of the palace so as not to alienate a 
potentially powerful new alliance. Hints of acceptance 
had already come from surprising quarters, perhaps 
in anticipation of a deal. Retired Chief of Army Staff 
General Sachchit Shamsher Rana, a staunch supporter of 
the king’s February move who had warned that talking to 
the Maoists was “anti-national” and could lead to the 
parties being banned,111 said in late October 2005 that 
the dialogue was not only acceptable but could even be 
helpful.112 Nevertheless, when the November agreement 
was announced, he reverted to his former position, warning 
that if the parties collaborate with 'terrorists', the state could 
take legal action against them. He termed the alliance 
 
 
107 “Unprecedented”, The Kathmandu Post editorial, 24 
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109 “Nepalis in the US welcome Parties-Maoist agreement”, 
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“unnatural” and declared it was a plot by “foreign self-
interest” to “bring Nepal to its knees”.113 
The U.S. has also moderated its language and offered 
a more nuanced view on the talks and agreement than 
earlier statements had implied. Ambassador Moriarty 
clarified that Washington was not opposed to talks but an 
alliance would be irresponsible.114 On a two-day visit to 
New Delhi that coincided with the party-Maoist talks that 
led to the agreement he explained to Indian foreign 
secretary Shyam Saran that “the United States welcomes 
attempts by Nepal’s political parties to convince the 
insurgents to rejoin the political mainstream”.115 However, 
he pointed out that “the political parties have publicly 
ruled out any formal relationship with the insurgents, 
unless and until the Maoists firmly renounce violence, 
put down their weapons, and commit to supporting 
the democratic process”.116 Once the agreement was 
announced, an American spokesman “cautiously 
welcomed the new political understanding reached 
between mainstream parties and Maoists”.117 
India’s reaction was also understandably guarded. A 
foreign ministry statement noted that “as Nepal’s close 
and friendly neighbour, [India] hopes that conditions of 
peace and stability and economic development will soon 
be restored in the country with the sincere efforts and 
contributions of all concerned”.118 It also implicitly 
reiterated its opposition to an external role in any future 
facilitation or mediation, stating that “all outstanding 
issues ought to be resolved through the efforts of the 
people of Nepal themselves and that the role of 
international community should be limited to support 
these efforts”.119 
Others have been studiously non-committal, careful not to 
burn bridges. Following India’s dropping of its endorsement 
of the “twin pillars” of multiparty democracy and 
constitutional monarchy in its public statements,120 the 
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120 See Crisis Group Briefing, Beyond Royal Rule, op. cit. 
European Union troika that visited in early October was 
similarly silent about the monarchy while implying that 
the king’s municipal elections were unwise.121 Some 
European diplomats privately view the Maoist-party 
dialogue as potentially positive but are happy that only 
India has to get its hands dirty assisting it.122 
The European Union and other donors – probably with 
the exception of China and Japan, whose policy of “non-
intervention” is based on longstanding sympathy for the 
palace – are likely to offer cautious endorsement in terms 
similar to those of India and the U.S. A meeting of major 
donors that took place in London on 18 November noted 
that “peace is a prerequisite for progress towards 
development” and called for “all actors to commit 
to a durable ceasefire as a first step to a wider peace 
process”.123 The meeting also reaffirmed “the willingness 
of donors to provide support to a democratic and 
inclusive peace process”. United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan has recognised the progress made in 
the November agreement but has called for an extended 
ceasefire, while reaffirming his willingness to use his 
good offices to assist any peace process.124 
Of the mood among Nepal’s citizens – so often ignored 
by all political players – nothing can be said with 
certainty. Reports of widespread disappointment that 
the government chose not to reciprocate the Maoists’ 
unilateral ceasefire seem plausible even if they cannot 
be verified by polling. Sentiment at the time of the 
government-Maoist talks in 2003 seemed to be firmly for 
dialogue if it could lead to peace. In the absence of any 
convincing evidence to the contrary, it is probably safe to 
assume that most Nepalis will welcome the agreement if 
it reflects a genuine commitment to finding a way out of 
the conflict. 
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VII. WHERE NEXT? 
A. DEADLOCK OR BREAKTHROUGH? 
Nepal’s politics are in a near stalemate that can be 
overcome only through a recombination of forces. The 
first step is a new polarisation of forces – a process the 
November agreement appears to advance considerably. 
However, polarisation alone will not be sufficient to 
generate a decisive shift. If the current equilibrium is to be 
transformed into a more dynamic asymmetry between the 
two strongest forces – the palace and the Maoists – the 
type of polarisation is equally important.125 Each of these 
forces is likely to preserve their internal unity for the 
foreseeable future. The seven-party alliance that occupies 
the middle ground could tip the balance if it retains unity 
while allying with one or the other side. This, however, 
is unlikely unless the middle ground leaders prove 
exceptionally skilled in managing internal tensions and 
conflicting interests. 
If the Maoists want to increase their leverage through 
joint action, it is in their interest that the parties remain 
united. In contrast, as long as the palace sees the parties as 
dispensable, it will attempt to divide them. Since the king 
cannot accommodate too many allies in top positions, it is 
in his interest to win over a few influential leaders. Any 
voluntary movement to his side without expectation of 
benefit would be a bonus. At the same time, he will be 
interested in winning over a larger number of supporters 
from the lower levels of the parties, who can be 
institutionally accommodated in municipal or other lower 
level bodies. 
Through such junior functionaries and their urban base, 
he can hope to cultivate support for the monarchy among 
the lower middle class, perhaps the numerically most 
significant segment of Kathmandu and other towns. By 
doing this, he may expect to induce splits within and 
between the two main parliamentary parties. Unlike the 
Maoists, the king will want to inflict as much damage on 
the political parties as possible. 
This factor will weigh heavily with the seven-party 
alliance, since such a division occurred in 2002, when the 
palace won over a significant part of the NC and so tilted 
 
 
125 Theoretically, a Maoist-palace alliance against the democratic 
mainstream would be possible. Close links between the two 
earlier in the conflict have made such a possibility a staple 
of the Kathmandu rumour-mill. However, while rural Maoist 
dominance certainly complements urban royal repression of the 
parties, an open palace-Maoist combination would be politically 
problematic, especially for a king who has justified his takeover 
on grounds of fighting terrorism. 
the balance between king and parties in its favour. In the 
current state of uncertainty, the risk of further division 
inhibits a more decisive response from the top-heavy NC 
– the party that would lose the most if it could not bring 
most of its leaders into the anti-royalist camp. The UML 
may not face the same problem at the top but lower-level 
urban leaders may be open to inducements. 
B. MAINSTREAM FAULT LINES 
Since trust has become a dominant factor in party thinking, 
and individual interests have become more important than 
party interests, there is uncertainty about the fault 
lines along which the mainstream polity might divide. 
Powerful politicians’ motivations vary according to their 
calculations of risks and benefits as well as assumptions 
about the motivations of others. This spreads greater 
uncertainty throughout the middle ground. 
Regardless of the November agreement with the Maoists, 
which calls for an active boycott, the king’s announcement 
of municipal elections on 8 February 2006 presents a 
crucial test for political parties. If positive results from the 
party-Maoist deal and further dialogue do not materialise 
quickly, some politicians could be tempted to participate. 
Leaders might decide to deputise loyal lower-level officials 
to contest the elections as independents so as to keep 
options open. Such functionaries might even participate in 
defiance of party orders. That would weaken the parties 
further and reduce the leaders’ leverage in talks with the 
Maoists.  
Repeated U.S. appeals to the parties to work with the king 
may encourage some leaders to stall the talks until all hope 
of reconciliation with the palace is definitively ruled 
out. Reactions to Ambassador Moriarty’s pre-alliance 
statement126 provide some indication of individual but not 
party thinking. For example, Bamdev Gautam of the UML 
and Narahari Acharya of the NC were dismissive of 
his suggestion, while Ram Sharan Mahat of the NC 
and Gopal Man Shrestha of the NC(D) welcomed it. There 
is still a high chance that parties, segments of parties or 
individual members may align themselves with the king. 
But this depends primarily on whether the palace is willing 
to change course to entice them. Equally, the chances of 
the parties remaining intact if they ally with the Maoists 
are low. 
 
 
126 “U.S. expresses concern over Maoists-parties ‘alliance’”, 
Kantipur Online, 4 November 2005. 
Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists 
Crisis Group Asia Report Nº106, 28 November 2005 Page 25 
 
 
 
 
C. DECISION TIME FOR THE PARTIES 
In the run-up to November 2005, the parties faced three 
immediate problems. To pre-empt any major division 
between the leaders and rank and file members over the 
municipal polls, they needed to finalise a deal with the 
Maoists as early as possible and restart their agitation, 
possibly jointly. At the same time, however, pushing 
through an alliance fast increased the risk of division 
between different factions. And while dealing with this 
dilemma, they will also wish to pursue the traditional 
strategy of applying pressure on the king to offer a 
compromise attractive enough to obviate the need for an 
alliance with the Maoists. However firm the November 
deal appears to be, the next rounds of talks between such 
indecisive parties and the Maoists could lead to several 
outcomes. 
In order to preserve internal unity, the leaders responsible 
for the negotiations still have to win over influential 
dissidents within their own parties by demonstrating that 
the initial agenda is broad enough to satisfy a wide variety 
of interests. They must also persuade the anti-Maoist 
sections in their camp that the Maoists can be trusted, and 
the alliance can achieve their objectives. The palace has 
been a significant player in Nepali politics for so long that 
it retains influence over many party leaders regardless of 
its behaviour. If the parties actively align with the Maoists, 
tipping the balance more decisively in favour of anti-palace 
forces, some conservatives will feel uneasy. If they cannot 
maintain complete unity, the parties can still pursue joint 
action with the Maoists, but at the cost of internal splits. 
In all these areas the NC is the most vulnerable party. It 
has plenty of leaders but little institutional coherence 
and discipline. This is why it may prefer to use talks to 
win concessions from the king. Since the Maoists have 
conceded its major demands, the NC may have insisted 
on parliamentary restoration in order to stall the talks 
without abandoning them, buying time while keeping 
options open. Koirala has voiced contradictory opinions, 
sacrificing consistency to prevent members breaking 
ranks.127 By playing for time, the party may also be 
hoping to extract greater concessions from the Maoists 
but the current agenda is so limited that these are hard to 
envisage, at least at this early stage. 
Since talks have already made some concrete progress, 
and there is no sign from the palace that an offer is 
forthcoming, the party will have to decide which course 
to pursue. Of the two issues on which problems have 
 
 
127 Of the other parties, the smaller Unity Centre could face a 
split because of the uncompromising hostility to the Maoists 
of its leader, Mohan Bikram Singh, but there are no firm 
signs of such a division yet. 
arisen, republicanism can be resolved within the 
framework of talks held so far. If the party continues 
to insist on restoration of parliament, either the Maoists 
will have to give in or the talks will have to go on without 
the NC. If the Maoists give in, the NC will have no other 
issue on which to stall. If the Maoists do not give in, the 
other parties will have to broker a compromise. If the 
NC eventually settles for alignment with the Maoists, 
some of its leaders will leave, and the priority will be 
damage control to ensure defections are not on the same 
scale as in 2002. 
If the NC either pulls out of the talks or continues to 
equivocate, the other parties could decide to formulate an 
agenda in order to pressure it. If the vague commitment of 
the November agreement is translated into a successful 
joint anti-palace agitation, the NC will be compelled 
to participate but without being able to bargain for 
concessions on the agenda. Such a course currently seems 
unlikely but the political equations are delicately poised 
and a number of outcomes are possible. They include 
the complete breakdown of talks and a return to the old 
Kathmandu deadlock. As always, such a breakdown 
would make the process of mutual confidence-building 
and resumption all the harder. 
D. THE KING’S CARDS 
The palace’s policy of deliberately provoking mutually 
antagonistic forces to unite against it seems hard to 
explain. However, the king still has cards to play. He and 
his advisers probably believe they can still derail the 
party-Maoist talks. Many individual politicians and party 
leaders have demonstrated that their professed opposition 
to Gyanendra’s ambitions can be overcome by offices and 
other incentives. Since late 2001, the parliamentary parties 
have periodically worked against each other to the benefit 
of both the palace and the Maoists. The king’s policy is 
no doubt informed by this history of inter- and intra-party 
strife and a shrewd understanding of the potentially 
divisive issues that could undercut progress towards 
an agreement. 
The palace has in the past successfully intervened to split 
the parties when they have shown signs of forging a 
dangerous unity. Now that the king has embarked on his 
project of rebuilding monarchical rule, the stakes are 
higher, and he has more to lose. It is likely, therefore, that 
he will exhaust other options before making any substantive 
compromise. Were he to offer concessions, they are not 
likely to be of a kind that would undermine the palace’s 
political role. However, he is gambling. The institution of 
monarchy has lost its sheen under Gyanendra. Mistrust 
between parties and king has grown to such an extent that 
those with long-term interests to consider may find it 
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beneficial to compromise with the Maoists rather than 
with the king. 
Under a combination of domestic and international 
pressure, the king may yet relent. The price for him might 
be high – restoring parliament, democratising the RNA or 
renouncing extraordinary constitutional powers – but 
the parties’ rationale for talks with the Maoists would 
disappear. The question would then be whether all-out 
conflict would resume or a new all-party government 
backed by a restored parliament would talk with the 
Maoists and manage to bring them into the mainstream. 
This is the least likely option: even if the king were to 
agree, the RNA would probably resist. For now, the most 
likely scenario is that talks will continue and some kind of 
agreement will be reached between the majority of the 
parliamentary parties and the Maoists. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although the November agreement is a large step 
forward, the ultimate outcome of the party-Maoist talks 
still cannot be predicted. Apart from the internal dynamics 
that the next stages of negotiations depend on, external 
factors could change matters. The parties and the Maoists 
do indeed have a good opportunity to shape a viable peace 
process. They have already addressed fundamental 
disagreements more convincingly, and with more chance 
of a viable compromise, than in previous talks. But 
negotiations are at an early stage and face many obstacles. 
The announced agreement represents only the start of a 
new phase. The palace and the army have been unwilling 
to reciprocate the Maoist ceasefire, let alone enter into 
substantive dialogue. The party-Maoist deal may tempt 
some royalists to talk but could also provoke a more severe 
backlash. As long as the king chooses not to come to the 
table – or is excluded from it – the potential for further 
confrontation remains. While a fully united party-Maoist 
front could perhaps force the palace’s hand, a less decisive 
outcome, which could spark renewed conflict, is more 
likely. 
For now, the parties are more receptive to the Maoists’ 
overtures. If the insurgency were to be defeated by 
the palace and the army, with the parties’ passive 
endorsement, it would in all likelihood strengthen the 
former. Negotiating with the rebels carries risks but 
India’s quiet backing has reduced mainstream leaders’ 
apprehensions. Negotiation also offers the best chance 
of tackling the Maoists politically, with a solid critique 
of specific aspects of their agenda and concrete policies 
to address other aspects. 
The Maoists have probably been the most successful 
opposition party in Nepal’s history, reshaping the national 
agenda and forcing others to confront long ignored issues. 
But this is easier than providing viable and acceptable 
policy options. Many of their proposed solutions, such as 
ethnic autonomy, are controversial or unworkable. Strong 
critiques of ill-considered proposals accompanied by 
better alternatives could tip the balance when it comes 
to tough bargaining. The parties could dissect Maoist 
policies and rethink solutions to commonly accepted 
problems while using the Maoists’ need for allies as 
powerful leverage. Without such approaches, they will 
have difficulty neutralising the rebels’ strategic and 
organisational superiority. 
Apart from the palace and its allies, there are three 
significant constituencies whose attitudes and actions could 
influence developments. The international community has 
always had trouble putting pressure on the Maoists and 
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now encounters similar problems with the king. Offering 
strong support to the democratic centre in searching for 
new ways forward, without pretending that solutions 
can be imposed from outside, seems a sensible option. 
Regardless of China’s creeping involvement and the 
interests of other big players, India will remain dominant. 
If it is convinced the parties should deal with the Maoists, 
the talks will likely continue. 
Civil society, despite the bold efforts of journalists, 
lawyers and others to resist extremism from both sides, 
has never had decisive influence. With neither arms nor 
organisational backing this is not surprising. But events 
since February 2005 have placed civil society leaders in 
a more prominent position, and many have responded to 
the challenge. If the parties and the Maoists are serious 
about reaching an agreement on democratic principles, 
civil society will be asked to smooth the path to 
legitimacy and to take risks in monitoring any deal. 
The people of Nepal at large are still, as always, the 
last to have a say. Surveys and anecdotal evidence have 
consistently indicated that the silent majority is desperate 
for peace. If the November agreement leads to a permanent 
Maoist ceasefire, negotiations over constitutional change 
and disarmament, most citizens are likely to welcome 
it. This would probably include most of those in the state 
security forces, who have never revelled in fighting a 
counter-insurgency. The king’s refusal to reciprocate the 
Maoists’ unilateral ceasefire may prove his most costly 
error of judgement. But it is for the parties and Maoists to 
demonstrate that they are capable of building peace. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 28 November 2005 
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LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SEVEN-PARTY ALLIANCE AND  
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEPAL (MAOIST) 
 
 
The long struggle between absolute monarchy and 
democracy in Nepal has now reached a very grave and 
new turn. Establishing peace by resolving the 10-year old 
armed conflict through a forward-looking political outlet 
has become the need of today. Therefore, implementing 
the concept of absolute democracy through a forward-
looking restructuring of the state has become an inevitable 
need to solve the problems related to class, caste, gender, 
region etc. of all sectors including political, economic, 
social and cultural, bringing autocratic monarchy to an 
end and establishing absolute democracy. We make 
public that, against this existing backdrop and reference in 
the country, the following understanding has been reached 
between the seven parliamentary parties and the CPN 
(Maoist) through different methods of talks.  
Points of Understanding: 
1. Today, democracy, peace, prosperity, social 
advancement and a free and sovereign Nepal is 
the chief wish of all Nepalese. We completely 
agree that autocratic monarchy is the main hurdle 
in (realising) this. It is our clear view that without 
establishing absolute democracy by ending 
autocratic monarchy, there is no possibility of 
peace, progress and prosperity in the country. 
Therefore, an understanding has been reached to 
establish absolute democracy by ending autocratic 
monarchy, with all forces against the autocratic 
monarchy centralizing their assault against 
autocratic monarchy from their respective positions, 
thereby creating a nationwide storm of democratic 
protests.  
2. The seven agitating parties are fully committed 
to the fact that only by establishing absolute 
democracy through the restoration of the Parliament 
with the force of agitation, forming an all-party 
government with complete authority, holding 
elections to a constituent assembly through 
dialogue and understanding with the Maoists, can 
the existing conflict in the country be resolved and 
sovereignty and state power completely transferred 
to the people. It is the view and commitment of the 
CPN (Maoist) that the above mentioned goal 
can be achieved by holding a national political 
conference of the agitating democratic forces, and 
through its decision, forming an interim government 
to hold constituent assembly elections. An 
understanding has been reached between the 
agitating seven parties and the CPN (Maoist) to 
continue dialogue on this procedural work-list and 
find a common understanding. It has been agreed 
that the force of people's movement is the only 
alternative to achieve this.  
3. Today, the country has demanded the establishment 
of permanent peace along with a positive solution 
to the armed conflict. Therefore, we are committed 
to ending autocratic monarchy and the existing 
armed conflict, and establishing permanent peace 
in the country through constituent assembly 
elections and forward-looking political outlet. The 
CPN (Maoist) expresses its commitment to move 
along the new peaceful political stream through 
this process. In this very context, an understanding 
has been reached to keep, during the holding 
of constituent assembly elections after ending 
autocratic monarchy, the armed Maoist force and 
the royal army under the supervision of the United 
Nations or any other reliable international 
supervision, to conclude the elections in a free and 
fair manner and accept the result of the elections. 
We expect reliable international mediation even 
during the dialogue process.  
4. Expressing clearly and making public institutional 
commitment to the democratic norms and values 
like the competitive multiparty system of 
governance, civil liberties, human rights, the 
concept of the rule of law, fundamental rights etc, 
the CPN (Maoist) has expressed commitment to 
move forward its activities accordingly.  
5. The CPN (Maoist) has expressed its commitment 
to create an environment allowing the political 
activists of other democratic parties displaced 
during the course of the armed conflict to return to 
their former localities and live there with dignity, 
return their home, land and property seized in an 
unjust manner and carry out their activities without 
let or hindrance.  
6. Undertaking self criticism and self evaluation of 
past mistakes, the CPN (Maoist) has expressed 
commitment not to repeat such mistakes in future.  
7. The seven political parties, undertaking self 
evaluation, have expressed commitment not to 
repeat the mistakes of the past which were 
committed while in parliament and in government.  
Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists 
Crisis Group Asia Report Nº106, 28 November 2005 Page 30 
 
 
 
 
8. In the context of moving the peace process 
forward, commitment has been expressed to fully 
respect the norms and values of human rights and 
press freedom and move ahead accordingly.  
9. As the announcement of municipal polls pushed 
forward with the ill-motive of deluding the people 
and the international community and giving 
continuity to the autocratic and illegitimate rule of 
the King, and the talk of elections to Parliament 
are a crafty ploy, we announce to actively boycott 
them and call upon the general public to make 
such elections a failure.  
10. The people and their representative political parties 
are the real guardians of nationality. Therefore, we 
are firmly committed to protecting the independence, 
sovereignty, geographical integrity of the country 
and national unity. Based on the principle of 
peaceful co-existence, it is our common obligation 
to maintain friendly relations with all countries of 
the world and good-neighbour relationship with 
neighbouring countries, especially India and China. 
But we request the patriotic masses to be cautious 
against the false attempt by the King and (his) 
loyalists to prolong his autocratic and illegitimate 
rule and delude the patriotic people by projecting 
the illusory "Mandale" nationalism and questioning 
the patriotism of the political parties, and appeal 
to the international powers and the people to 
support, in every possible way, the democratic 
movement against autocratic monarchy in Nepal.  
11. We call upon the civil society, professional 
organizations, various wings of parties, people of 
all communities and regions, press and intellectuals 
to actively participate in the peaceful movement 
launched on the basis of these understandings 
centered on democracy, peace, prosperity, forward-
looking social change and the country's 
independence, sovereignty, and pride.  
12. Regarding the inappropriate conducts that took 
place between the parties in the past, a common 
commitment has been expressed to investigate 
any objection raised by any party over such 
incidents, take action if found guilty, and to make 
the action public. An understanding has been 
reached to settle any problem emerging between 
the parties through peaceful dialogue at the 
concerned level or at the leadership level. 
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violent conflict. Based on information and assessments 
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
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situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
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foreign ministries and international organisations and 
made available simultaneously on the website, 
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with 
governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board -- which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media -- is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior 
policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired 
by Lord Patten of Barnes, former European Commissioner 
for External Relations. President and Chief Executive 
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